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As public governments around the world face limited funding capacity for capital-
intensive projects, their attention is turned towards the private sector for financing. Public-
private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as an alternative project delivery method in 
which the public and private sectors work together for the provision of urban projects. In 
deciding whether to enter into a PPP agreement, both the public and private will have to 
conduct the financial viability of the partnership. This thesis aims to provide a framework 
for estimating a project’s financial viability of large-scale urban projects, by addressing the 
crucial components associated with large-scale urban projects. These components include 
the type of PPP arrangement, contract length, financial structure, project cash flows, and 
capital budgeting. As part of the overall financial viability, the framework will also take 
into consideration the effects of uncertainties associated with a project or risks on the 
project’s profitability; then, various risk management strategies that aim to provide better 
hedging of risks will be discussed.  
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ...........................................................................................................x 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ xi 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 6 
2.1 PPP vs. Public Procurement ...................................................................6 
2.2 Financing of PPP Projects ......................................................................8 
2.3 PPP Risks .............................................................................................10 
2.4 Financial Viability ...............................................................................11 
3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 14 
3.1 Description ...........................................................................................14 
3.1.1 Project Inputs ....................................................................................16 
3.1.2 Risk Management .............................................................................16 
3.1.3 Financial Viability ............................................................................18 
4. PROJECT DELIVERY METHODS: COMPARISON AND EMERGENCE OF PPPS20 
5. INPUTS TO THE FRAMEWORK: PROJECT INFORMATION 24 
5.1 Concession Term .................................................................................24 
5.1.1 Concession Term Options ...........................................................25 
5.1.2 Determining the Concession Term .............................................25 
5.2 PPP Arrangements ...............................................................................26 
5.2.1 Services Contract ........................................................................28 
5.2.2 Operations and Maintenance Contract ........................................28 
5.2.3 Design Build ...............................................................................29 
5.2.4 Build Operate Transfer ...............................................................29 
5.2.5 Design Build Finance Operate Maintain .....................................30 
5.2.6 Concession ..................................................................................31 
vii 
 
5.3 PPP Financing ......................................................................................32 
5.3.1 Project Financing ........................................................................32 
5.3.2 Funding Sources..........................................................................34 
5.3.2.1 Public vs. Private Funds ..................................................35 
5.3.2.1.1 Public Funds........................................................35 
5.3.2.1.2 Private Funds ......................................................36 
5.3.2.2 Debt vs. Equity................................................................36 
5.3.2.2.1 Debt .....................................................................37 
5.3.2.2.2 Equity ..................................................................38 
6. PROJECT CASH FLOW 40 
6.1 Costs .....................................................................................................40 
6.1.1 Life-cycle Costs ..........................................................................41 
6.1.2 Future and Opportunity ...............................................................42 
6.1.3 Different Cost Classifications .....................................................43 
6.1.3.1 Direct, Indirect, and Overhead Costs ..............................43 
6.1.3.2 Fixed and Variable Costs ................................................44 
6.2 Revenues ..............................................................................................45 
6.2.1 User-Based ..................................................................................45 
6.2.2 Government-Based .....................................................................46 
6.2.3 Indirect Revenues: Economic Impact .........................................46 
7. RISK 49 
7.1 Risks in PPPs .......................................................................................49 
7.2 Risk Identification ................................................................................50 
7.2.1 Construction Risk........................................................................51 
7.2.2 Investment Risk: Demand, Revenue, and Maintenance Risks ...52 
7.2.3 Political and Legislative Risks ....................................................53 
7.2.4 Site-specific Risks .......................................................................54 
7.2.5 Operating Risks ...........................................................................54 
viii 
 
7.2.6 Economic and Financial Risks ....................................................55 
7.2.7 Force Majeure Risks ...................................................................55 
7.3 Risk Assessment ..................................................................................56 
7.3.1 Bayesian Analysis .......................................................................59 
7.3.2 Decision Trees ............................................................................61 
7.3.3 Monte Carlo Simulation ..............................................................63 
7.3.4 Artificial Neural Networks .........................................................66 
7.3.5 Method of Moments ....................................................................68 
7.3.6 Value at Risk ...............................................................................72 
7.4 Risk Mitigation ....................................................................................76 
7.4.1 Risk Allocation ...........................................................................77 
7.4.2 Risk Mitigation Tools .................................................................81 
7.4.2.1 Guarantees .......................................................................82 
7.4.2.2 Interest Rate Swaps .........................................................83 
7.4.2.3 Options ............................................................................84 
7.4.2.4 Forwards and Futures ......................................................85 
ix 
 
8. CAPITAL BUDGETING 87 
8.1 Net Present Value ................................................................................87 
8.2 Internal Rate of Return.........................................................................89 
8.3 Return on Investment and Equity ........................................................89 
8.4 Payback Period.....................................................................................90 
8.5 Debt-to-Equity Ratio ............................................................................91 
8.6 Cover Ratios.........................................................................................92 
8.7 Solvency Ratio .....................................................................................93 
8.8 Value for Money ..................................................................................93 




List of Tables 
Table 7.1 Overview of Research into the Presented Risk Methods .......................58 
Table 7.2 A Comparison of Risk Allocation Preferences in PPP Projects. Source 
(Han, 2013) .......................................................................................79 
xi 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 PPP Methodological Framework ..........................................................15 
Figure 5.1 Comparison of Public and Private Sector Involvement in PPP 
Arrangements (Delmon, 2010) .........................................................27 
Figure 7.1 Example of Bayesian Analysis .............................................................60 
Figure 7.2 Example of Decision Tree ....................................................................62 




With current economies experiencing difficulties in securing public funds for 
infrastructure, governments around the world are being faced with the challenge of being 
able to keep up with growing infrastructure needs. Failing to fund infrastructure projects 
could lead to detrimental effects on economic growth, which can in turn affect the local 
and regional job market, and the ability to attract new businesses and investments. Lack of 
economic development will also affect tax revenues, availability of government funding, 
and the ability to compete in an increasingly competitive state, regional national and global 
markets.   The need for new funding sources has motivated the public sector to look towards 
private entities to provide funding for capital-intensive infrastructure projects, a trend that 
has been growing steadily in recent times (Savas E. , 2005; Savas E. , 2000; Yescombe, 
2007; Li B. , Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005). The private sector has also found 
that in many instances funding public infrastructure development is profitable and therefore 
of interest in a time when other investments have a lower yield, with a recent trend being 
that the private entity assumes responsibility of a facility for a set period of time (Savas E. 
, 2005) . The need for new public infrastructure funding sources and the desire for higher 
yield investments has encouraged public and private entities to partner together in what has 
become commonly known as a Public-Private Partnership (PPP). This joint partnership 
allows both parties, by combining their special skills, to achieve results that neither party 
could have achieved alone (Akintoye, Hardcastle, & Beck, 2003). 
In addition to providing a monetary stimulus to undertake projects, the private 
sector’s involvement has also included the actual construction, operation, and maintenance 
of certain infrastructure facilities. PPPs have taken many forms that range from performing 
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maintenance works on an existing infrastructure to design, build, and finance, operate, and 
maintain new projects, as in the DBFOM contract type. Each PPP arrangement has its own 
characteristics and complexities, with each variation entailing a different type and amount 
of risk that each partner will have to handle. Therefore, despite PPPs providing a suitable 
alternative source of funding public infrastructure, developing such agreements is a 
complex and expensive process (Akintoye, Hardcastle, & Beck, 2003). Other PPP 
arrangements and contract types will be discussed in a later section of this thesis. 
The urban environment has been one of the main adopters of PPPs in recent years, 
with several large-scale projects, both “greenfield” and “brownfield”, being undertaken 
with the cooperation of both the public and private sectors. A “greenfield” project is one 
that is built on a new location where no facility existed before the PPP project, while a 
“brownfield” project is related to existing facilities that might be rehabilitated or 
reconstructed within the existing right of way. PPPs have become more common in a 
variety of fields such as transportation, social infrastructure (health facilities, schools etc.), 
public utilities, and government offices (Sagalyn, 2011). Private entities partner with the 
public sector to provide such urban development projects with the goal of achieving a 
certain return on an investment, and making profits. The public entity, on the other hand, 
has a duty to provide such services to the tax-paying public, and the addition of a profit-
seeking private entity into the mix has caused some unrest among certain factions of the 
public (Yescombe, 2007).  
In the transportation sector, toll roads are a common type of PPP project. The 
private entity can be involved in one of several ways, but with the ultimate goal of 
achieving profits. Therefore, questions have been raised whether turning to the private 
sector for the provision of services in the urban environment is the best route for the public 
sector, especially since the public sector could be able to procure a project at a lower cost. 
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However, this argument does not consider the fact that governments are often faced with 
limited funding alternatives and cannot undertake a project unless private funds are made 
available, taxes are raised or debt is incurred through government bonds. Therefore, in 
many instances, partnering with the private sector might be the most economically viable 
and publicly acceptable way to provide certain necessary capital and/or operational 
investments that are crucial to the construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities. 
Such investments have the potential to be recovered by the public sector in some cases 
through a boosted economy that provides a better standard of living to the taxpayers.  
There has also been a growing need to spend more on existing infrastructure in 
order to maintain adequate performance standards for the public. The American Society of 
Civil Engineers (ASCE) Report Card of America’s Infrastructure (ASCE, 2013)has 
estimated that approximately $3.6 trillion dollars will be needed to maintain the United 
States’ current infrastructure at its current D+ score, a score that has been provided by the 
ASCE.  This funding need does not consider additional, new transportation facilities that 
are needed to relieve congestion, improve freight operations and enhance economic 
competitiveness. 
There exist a variety of considerations that should be studied to ensure the success 
of a PPP project. First, in order to be able to attract private investment, the project must be 
attractive to the investor. This can be achieved by decreasing the amount of risk that an 
investor might bear, and by offering the possibility of competitive and long-term revenue 
streams. In addition, governments may assist by offering special assistance, or certain 
financial guarantees, and by establishing a favorable legal and regulatory framework. The 
interests of the public sector; however, should not be compromised, and the expectations 
of both parties must be clearly stated at the onset of any partnership, with both parties 
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ensuring that their joint fulfillment is a top priority. There are several methods that both 
the private and public entities utilize to assess the attractiveness of PPPs  
Besides providing a source of funding governments, the private sector’s 
involvement in the provision of infrastructure has other benefits. It is believed that the 
private entity can deliver a project faster, more efficiently, and with increased reliability 
(Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, 2009). In addition, the quality of the infrastructure is also believed 
to be superior when a private partner is involved. 
This thesis provides a framework for assessing the financial viability of urban PPP 
projects, with no specific focus on one industry or one geographical location, and by taking 
into consideration the interests of both the public and private partners. The objective of this 
thesis is to provide a framework that considers the following five elements in the analysis 
of financial viability: 1) the type of PPP arrangement, 2) the contract duration, 3) the 
financial structure 4) the revenues and costs, and the 5) various risks associated with the 
project. This framework provides a detailed consideration of all the input factors, and 
includes an extensive description of risk management, including tools and 
recommendations, which differ from existing efforts to describe PPP financial viability 
frameworks.  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides a review of the existing 
literature on project financial viability. Chapter 2 discusses the different project delivery 
methods that have been used. Chapter 3 provides the methodological framework for 
evaluating a project’s financial viability. Chapter 4 will describe the inputs needed for the 
analysis, which include the type of PPP arrangement, the length of the contract, and the 
financial structure. Chapter 5 discusses the project’s cash flow, in terms of revenues and 
costs. Chapter 6 provides an in depth discussion on the various risks that are associated 
with PPP projects and how they should be managed. Chapter 7 includes a summary of the 
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financial metrics that can be used to assess the financial viability of PPPs. Finally, 
conclusions drawn from this study are provided in Chapter 8. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  PPP vs. Public Procurement 
Many studies have been aimed at comparing the features of a PPP and the public 
procurement of projects (Yescombe, 2007; Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2008; Burger & 
Hawkesworth, 2011; Grimsey & Lewis, 2007)... Contrary to the case of a standard design, 
bid, build (DBB) contract, which is a typical traditional delivery method of public 
infrastructure, PPPs offer another dimension to the financing, design, operations, and 
maintenance of public assets. In a DBB contract, the public authority designs and finances 
a project that will be constructed by a private contractor, using funding from tax revenues 
or public borrowing (Yescombe, 2007; Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011). The public entity 
assumes the full responsibility of funding the project, including cost overruns, and also 
operates and maintains the facility after completion of construction. As an alternative, PPPs 
provide the public entity with the option of financing projects using private  funds, with 
the additional potential  benefit of  the private sector’s expertise in providing large-scale 
infrastructure projects on time and with an expected quality level (World Bank, 2015; 
Sabol & Puentes, 2014; Grimsey & Lewis, 2007).  
According to a study of 114 PPPs in 2009 by the UK’s National Audit Office, 
around 70 percent of projects were delivered on time, with 65 percent being within the 
original budget. In addition, the University of Melbourne, in Australia, compared 42 
projects procured under traditional delivery methods with 25 PPPs. They found that PPPs 
provide significantly greater cost certainty, with a cost escalation of 4 percent, compared 
to 18 percent with the traditional methods (PwC, 2010; Yescombe, 2007) 
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The nature of the relationship between the public and private sectors can take one 
of many forms. Different types of agreements between both entities exist, each with its 
own set of advantages, disadvantages, and complications. PPPs can be classified in a 
variety of ways, which include the structure of the agreement, the legal nature of 
involvement of the private sector, or according to the nature of the contracted service and 
the allocation of risk among the different parties (Yescombe, 2007) . The common forms 
of PPP arrangements that exist are: 1) services contracts, 2) operations and maintenance 
contracts, 3) design-build (DB), 3) build-operate-transfer (BOT), 4) build-own-operate-
transfer, 5) design-build-operate-finance-maintain (DBOFM), and 6) concession 
agreements (GAO, 1999; FHWA, 2010; Asian Development Bank, 2008; Infrastructure 
Australia, 2008; Delmon, 2010).There are other forms of PPP arrangements that have been 
used, such as lease and affermage, and complete privatization, but they have not been 
included in this thesis for further discussion.  
Another defining structure of a PPP agreement is related to how revenues are 
collected, and this could take one of two basic forms: user-based or government-based. In 
the former, revenues are collected directly from the users of the facility, such as tolls on 
toll roads, while the latter is based on the delivery of the facility, such as the delivery of a 
hospital according to specific quality standards (Yescombe, 2007; Farquharson, Mastle, 
Yescombe, & Encinas, 2011; World Bank; ADB; IDB, 2014). PPPs are also defined based 
on how they are procured. In that sense, a PPP could be funded using private finance, in 
which the private partner relies on the project’s cash flows to obtain funding. This is also 
referred to as limited or non-recourse financing, or off-balance sheet financing. On the 
other hand, a PPP may be funded based on on-balance sheet financing. This means that the 
private partner will obtain funding based on its own balance sheet, without regard to the 
project itself and its own merits (FHWA, 2013; World Bank, 2015; Yescombe, 2007).  
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2.2  Financing of PPP Projects  
PPPs have been viewed as a tool for off-balance sheet financing, but it also provides 
the public entity with the opportunity to invest in a project that would have otherwise not 
been procured at all. The funding of public-private partnership projects can be obtained in 
several ways. One such method is through government funding. As previously mentioned, 
the advantages of involving the private sector in the provision of public services are not 
limited to financial contributions. The private sector is also believed to bring expertise and 
efficiency into infrastructure provision, mainly through executing projects faster, providing 
better quality, and delivering with lower costs. That is why the government may choose to 
provide funding for some, or even all, of the project’s costs. Examples of such a funding 
mechanism is in a Design-Build-Operate project, in which the government pays the private 
entity in lump-sums after completing certain stages of a project, and offering an operating 
fee to operate the facility (World Bank, 2014). In return, the public entity may receive 
revenue if excess revenues remain after paying the private entity.  
Another funding mechanism is referred to as corporate finance, in which the private 
entity agrees to fund the project based on its own balance sheet, rather than on the project 
itself. This method might be riskier, since the private investor will have less borrowing 
capacity to fund other projects due to a rising debt to equity ratio. Therefore, this method 
is common for low-value projects that might not require off-balance sheet financing. This 
method, which is also referred to as on-balance sheet finance, has the benefit of a lower 
financing cost relative to funding the project on the basis of the project itself. 
Project finance is one of the most common financing mechanisms of PPP projects. 
The project funding raised through loans or bond debt in this type of arrangement is secured 
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based solely on the revenue streams of the project.  A  special purpose vehicle (SPV), with 
no existing business, is created to operate the project and provides for off-balance sheet 
financing, which is  also referred to as limited or non-recourse financing (Fight, 2006; 
Finnerty, 2013; World Bank, 2014). One reason why a private entity might choose to 
finance a project based solely on the project’s revenue streams is to share the risk in 
carrying out a project, due to the damage that the project may have on the company’s own 
finances if the project fails to achieve expectations.   (World Bank, 2015; Akintoye & Beck, 
2009; Vinter, 2006).. Borrowing off a balance sheet means that the private entity would 
not have to show any borrowing for the project, and therefore would not risk its credit 
rating.  This benefits the private entity since project debt would not hamper its attempts to 
raise money on the capital markets for other ventures (Finnerty, 2013; Fight, 2006; Vinter, 
2006). 
It must be noted that financing a project through private funds would be expected 
to cost more than using public funds, around 2-3 percent higher (Yescombe, 2007). This is 
due to the fact that the government is assumed to at low risk of default, which means it can 
generally borrow money at the lowest possible rate (Carmichael, 2015). However, the 
benefits of using private finance includes using less public money, the opportunity to 
procure projects that would have been otherwise unachievable, and allowing for faster 
investment in public infrastructure (Yescombe, 2007). 
Moreover, there are several sources of financing for PPP projects, which include 
equity contributions, debt contributions, bank and performance guarantees, bond and 
capital market financing, and mezzanine financing (Finnerty, 2013; Fight, 2006; Akintoye 
& Beck, 2009; World Bank, 2014). The choice of which method to use will affect the risk 
that is borne by the private entity that is attempting to secure funds. These different 
financing sources will be discussed in a later section of this thesis. 
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2.3  PPP Risks  
While there are many definitions of risk in the literature, the majority center on the 
main idea of potentially experiencing losses on a project due to the occurrence of a certain 
unfavorable event. One definition that will be used in this thesis is that of the Royal Society 
in Britain, which defines risk as ‘the probability that a particular adverse event occurs 
during a stated period of time or results from a particular challenge’ (Royal Society, 1983). 
Project risks can be classified in several ways, which help in understanding them, such as 
internal and external risks, project-specific and country-specific risks, based on the project 
phases that the risks belong to (Akintoye, Hardcastle, & Beck, 2003; Grimsey & Lewis, 
2004; Pantelias & Zhang, 2010). Despite the varieties in classifying risks, the classification 
mainly serves as a way to understand the risks better, without major differences in the 
specific types of risks encompassed within each classification.   
There has been research work focused on managing risks, and the related topics in 
risk management. The literature provides varying methods on how risk should be managed; 
however, the majority includes the same components: 1) risk identification, 2) risk analysis, 
and 3) risk mitigation. This method of risk management will be discussed further 
throughout this thesis. The first stage of the method involves identifying risks, and there 
has been ample literature that has attempted to provide a comprehensive view of risks in 
PPP projects. Several types of risks exist in the different stages of PPP projects, and they 
include: technical risk, construction risk, operating risk, revenue risk, financial risks, force 
majeure risk, regulatory/political risk, environmental risk, and project default, among 
others (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Akintoye, Hardcastle, & Beck, 2003; Asian Development 
Bank, 2008; Yescombe, 2007). 
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Within risk management, one area of study that has been growing is concerned with 
quantifying risks. There have been many studies that have been devoted specifically to 
using mathematical models and statistical tools to quantify risks including techniques such 
as Monte Carlo Simulation and the method of moments (Damnjanovic, 2006; Zhang & 
Damnjanovic, 2006; Zhao & Ono, 2001; Pantelias & Zhang, 2010).. There are methods 
that have been proliferating in fields of study other than infrastructure, particularly in 
finance, to quantitatively measure the effect of risks on PPP projects. Such methods include 
Bayesian analysis (Koller, 1999; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Stone, 2013; Haimes, 1998), 
decision trees (Koller, 1999; Damodaran, 2008; Haimes, 1998), artificial neural networks 
(Chang M. , 2011; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Koller, 1999) , and value at risk (Jorion, 2000; 
Crouhy, Galai, & Mark, 2000; Best, 2000; Damodaran, Value at Risk, 2003). 
 
2.4  Financial Viability 
The assessment of the attractiveness, or measures of success, of PPP projects is 
accomplished through a financial viability analysis. The financial viability of a PPP project 
differs for the different stakeholders in the agreement. The public sector is believed to seek 
financial viability through obtaining the best value for money (VfM) (Yescombe, 2007). 
The value for money is not a measure of what is least expensive, but it accounts for the 
combination of risk transfer, whole-life project costs, and service provided by the facility. 
A popular method used to measure VfM is through the public sector comparator (PSC) 
(Quiggin, 2004; Cruz & Marquez, 2013; Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Although there are 
several techniques for evaluating the VfM of a project, the PSC has been widely adopted 
and is one of the most commonly used methods. The PSC essentially evaluates the 
difference in cost between undertaking the project without a private partner or through a 
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PPP. In some cases, when attempting to compare to the case of the government performing 
the project without a private partner, an alternative cannot be estimated, which means that 
if the project is not undertaken as a PPP, it will not be procured at all.  
For the private partner, the main objective of entering into a PPP agreement is 
profitability and return on investment. The private partner will conduct a financial viability 
assessment by looking, mainly, at the project’s cash flows. Also, the private partner will 
make a decision on how to finance the project, by assessing the options of project finance 
or on-balance sheet financing. This will affect the lender’s decision in participating in the 
PPP. As a result, and from the lender’s perspective, achieving financial viability is done 
through the repayment of debt, which involves the analysis of the project’s costs and 
revenues. Essentially, for a commercial lender, if the project’s revenue streams are not 
attractive it will not participate in the project. For the analysis of the attractiveness of the 
revenue streams of the project, and comparing with the project’s costs to estimate profits, 
several financial metrics are used. In order to assess the profitability and the attractiveness 
of a project, the cash flows and the amount invested must be analyzed. Two of the most 
common methods to analyze the profitability and attractiveness of long-term investments 
in projects, for both the private partners and their lenders, include the Net Present Value 
(NPV) analysis and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (Yescombe, 2007; Zhang X. , 2005).  
One of the main sources of funds for a project is through commercial debt, and the 
ability of the private partner to repay its debt is crucial to the success of any PPP. Therefore, 
specific cover ratios (CRs) such as the Annual Debt Service Cover Ratio (ADSCR) and the 
Loan Life Cover Ratio (LLCR) are used by lenders to evaluate the borrower’s ability to 
repay its debt, and thus the attractiveness of a PPP endeavor. Commercial banks, under 
common PPP arrangements, are not entitled to a share of the project’s profits, and 
combined with the attitude of the world’s banking regulations, which have become stricter 
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after the recent financial crisis in 2007, make commercial lenders risk averse. Therefore, 
banks will conduct an in depth, due diligence financial analysis before agreeing to 
participate in a PPP project. Other non-commercial lenders might have other metrics for 
the evaluation of project attractiveness, such as promoting a country’s industry in the case 
of an export credit agency (Vinter, 2006). PPPs are also funded partly by equity. It is 
common for equity to make up a smaller share than debt of the total funds that are required 
for a project. The main equity contributors to a project are the private partners themselves, 
but governments and lenders have also provided equity funding to PPPs in the past 
(Finnerty, 2013; World Bank, 2014; Fight, 2006). 
This chapter provides a literature review on the main components that make up the 
framework presented in this thesis. A brief overview on the distinction between PPPs and 
public procurement is given, and it was found that PPPs have emerged as a viable 
alternative to traditional public procurement in some cases. In addition, a review of the 
financing alternatives of PPPs was presented. It was found that there are several options 
available to the project partners who wish to undertake a PPP project, and they will be 
discussed in greater detail in a later chapter of this thesis. Moreover, a review of risk 
management in PPP projects was conducted and it was found that most procedures focus 
on three main stages: risk identification, assessment, and mitigation. Finally, a review of 
the financial viability analysis metrics was presented, and several metrics were found to be 
commonly used, such as the NPV, IRR, and the VfM analysis for PPP projects. The 
following chapter will detail the methodological framework that is proposed by this thesis 
on assessing the financial viability of PPP projects, followed by subsequent chapters that 
will discuss in greater detail the elements of the framework.  
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3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1   Description 
Figure 3.1 illustrates a framework showing the overall interaction of all the factors 
in a PPP, which are crucial to the determination of the financial viability of a project. As 
shown in the figure, the main elements of a PPP interact with each other and affect the 
financial outcome of a project. The PPP agreement between the public owner of the project 
and the private investors involves a complex network of relationships among financing, 
risks, revenues and costs that need to be analyzed to determine whether an investment 
would be profitable or not. The process involved in determining a project’s financial 
viability starts with analyzing the PPP agreement, the contract duration, and the financial 
structure. With this information, the revenues and costs of the project can be identified, and 
a cash flow constructed. However, it is important to note the effect of risks on a project’s 
cash flow, and an adjusted cash flow should be constructed after the risk management 
stage. Afterwards, financial metrics are used to determine a project’s financial viability. 
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Figure 3.1 PPP Methodological Framework 
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3.1.1 PROJECT INPUTS 
 
The owner of the facility, i.e. the public sector, is the main decision maker on 
whether to procure the project through a PPP or another delivery method. Once the decision 
on selecting a PPP as the delivery method is made, and a specific PPP arrangement is 
decided upon, a contract is drafted between the owner and the private sector defining the 
details of the project, following a request for proposals and the identification of the 
preferred private company bidder. The contract would include the scope of the project, the 
level of involvement of each partner, the length of the agreement, the financial structure, 
the revenue source scheme of the private entity, and the allocation of risks. 
The PPP arrangement and the financial structure will determine the costs and 
estimate the revenues of the project, and in combination with the length of the contract the 
project’s cash flows can be constructed. The costs and revenues will serve as inputs to the 
risk management stage, in which they will be adjusted for risk. 
 
3.1.2  RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
PPPs provide the public entity with a method of transferring more risk-s to the 
private partner. A risk management strategy is described in this thesis that involves three 
successive stages: risk identification, risk assessment, and risk mitigation. The three 
processes combine to give project managers a better understanding of the risks that might 
occur, the potential impacts of the risks, and how the risk impacts can be reduced. The 
thesis provides a discussion on risk management, and describes several methods to quantify 
the impact of risk on projects. After considering options for risk management, a more 
accurate cash flow can be constructed and analyzed for assessing financial viability.  
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In the risk identification stage, all the project risks will be identified  , and will serve 
as inputs to the sensitivity analysis After conducting the sensitivity analysis, a list of the 
most sensitive variables is identified, 𝑋 =  {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛}, where 𝑥𝑖 refers to a sensitive 
risk variable. These sensitive variables are then assessed using the risk assessment methods 
proposed in this thesis, such as Monte Carlo Simulation and the Method of Moments. The 
output of the risk assessment method will be the distributions of revenues and costs, along 
with their expected values and standard deviations. That is, probability distributions for 
each sensitive variable are generated. As an example, consider user-based revenues, 
described here as a function of the values of the sensitive variables 𝑈(𝑋). The variation in 
user-based revenues, with changes in the sensitive variables, will be studied, and a 
probability distribution of the user-based revenues will be produced; 
(𝑢1, 𝑝1), (𝑢2, 𝑝2), … , (𝑢𝑛, 𝑝𝑛). This is done concurrently for all revenue and cost 
components, other than user-based revenues, in order to obtain expected values of revenues 
and costs. Finally, after identifying the risk-adjusted revenue and cost components, risk 
mitigation practices and tools are implemented.  
The output from the risk management stage will be revenue and cost variables that 
will be used to construct the risk-adjusted cash flow. This framework focuses on a risk 
management strategy that provides additional detail to what is already present in the 
literature. It combines tools and concepts from various literature sources and from various 
fields of study, as will be discussed later in the thesis, to provide one comprehensive 
framework that includes a detailed methodology for risk management. The risk 
management process is at the core of this framework, which aims at providing a more 
accurate financial viability procedure. 
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3.1.3 FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
 
The final decision of a project’s financial viability is determined t after considering 
several financial metrics and ratios using the risk adjusted values expressed in the modified 
cash flow. This thesis describes these metrics and discusses how they can be used to assess 
a project’s profitability. For example, the Net Present Value (NPV) of the investment, a 
metric which is described in Chapter 8, is calculated using Equation 3.1 below. 
 









(𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑛: The difference in risk adjusted revenues and costs for each year of the 
analysis 
𝐶𝐼: Capital Investment, referring to the initial investment in the project 
𝑖: Project’s discount rate 
𝑁: Project’s contract duration 
 
The public sector, in its process of analyzing a project’s financial viability, 
compares the potential gains and/or losses due to selecting a PPP instead of other more 
traditional procurement methods. After using the financial metrics and conducting the 
necessary analysis, a decision is arrived on whether to proceed with the PPP venture or not.  
A project’s procurement method is one of the most important considerations 
stakeholders must account for before undertaking an investment. Project delivery methods 
have evolved over the years, from the most traditional method, the Design Bid Build 
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(DBB), to having a construction manager at risk (CMAR), and a Design Build (DB) 
strategy, all of which will be discussed in Chapter 4. Considering that each delivery method 
has an effect on the budget, schedule, and risk of the project, the choice of project delivery 
method should take into consideration these effects, as well as the stakeholders’ expertise, 
at the earliest stages of project procurement. The following chapter aims to provide a 
discussion on the most common project delivery methods, and presenting their advantages 
and disadvantages.  
The chapters that follow will discuss the elements that make up the three main 
components of the methodological framework presented in this chapter. Chapter 4 will start 





4. PROJECT DELIVERY METHODS: COMPARISON AND 
EMERGENCE OF PPPs 
 
A project delivery method is a process that dictates the overall scope of a project in 
terms of design, construction, maintenance, including the interaction among the project 
stakeholders. It encompasses a wide array of project variables, from the overall project 
delivery structure to the final closeout deliverables, including the financing details, risk 
allocation, scheduling of design and construction operations,, and maintenance 
responsibilities (TCRP, 2009). The project delivery method involves setting the contractual 
nature among the project stakeholders necessary to undertake a project. Inefficiencies in 
the performance of projects particularly due to cost, quality, and time to completion of 
projects led to the evolution of project delivery methods from DBB to current hybrid 
systems such as DB, for example (TCRP, 2009; CMAA, 2012).  
The traditional design-bid-build (DBB) method involves three sequential and 
separate phases: design, bid, and build. The design phase often involves contracting with a 
designer or architect to fully complete a design for the project. The bidding phase is when 
a contractor is chosen to build the project, using the design documents completed by the 
designer in the design phase, and based on fixed-price, total cost considerations. Finally, 
based on the decision of the bidding phase, a contractor is chosen and the project is built 
during the build phase.  This linear method has been popular throughout the 20th century, 
especially in the U.S., and it involves three main participants: the owner, the designer, and 
the contractor, and two main contracts: owner-designer and owner-contractor. The owner-
designer contract, however, might not exist if the owner is the designer. The contractual 
nature and the interaction between the project stakeholders are relatively simple to 
understand and are clearly defined, which is one advantage of this method.  
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Several drawbacks exist, however, mainly due to the contract structure of the DBB 
method. After the design phase, the owner receives the project’s design, and the 
relationship with the designer ends. This means that, during the construction phase, the 
owner is held liable for any faulty design, which means the cost is borne by the owner 
during the remainder of the project. Moreover, DBB contracts are commonly awarded to 
the lowest bidder, and in such cases this means that contractors, who generally submit a 
low bid on a project, would resort to increasing the costs of items that might be subject to 
change orders that are initiated by the owner or the contractors themselves, in order to 
generate profit from the project.  This approach allocates the design risk to the owner of 
the project and, in fact, most of the project risks are borne by the project’s owner, since it 
is the main participant of the contracts.  
In an attempt to resolve the deficiencies of a DBB contract, a construction manager 
(CM) may be added to the agreement that primarily assumes the performance risk of a 
project. This method is referred to as Construction Manager at Risk (CMAR), whereby the 
CM guarantees the delivery of a project according to a fixed schedule and/or budget. One 
common element of the CMAR contract is that the CM generally offers a guaranteed 
maximum price (GMP), which sets the maximum possible cost that the owner will pay, 
thereby transferring the risks of paying over that price to the CM. Another common element 
of the CMAR contract is the involvement of the CM during the design phase of the project, 
and thus communicating with the designer. This also reduces a portion of the design risk 
that the owner must bear, who might not have the necessary resources or expertise to 
manage the project design or evaluate constructability issues that can be addressed by the 
CM construction expert team. This could also mean that there may be an overlap between 
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the design and construction phases – an option that is used to expedite project delivery and 
reduce the project delivery schedule 
In this delivery method, there are three main participants: the owner, the designer, 
and the CM, and two separate contracts are agreed: owner-designer and owner-CM. The 
selection of the winning bid is made based on its best value being offered based on 1) 
lowest and best bid, 2) bid price + project time to completion (A + B) or other options. 
A third project delivery method that has gained popularity in recent years is the 
design build (DB) method. In a DB structure, the owner contracts out both the design and 
the construction to one entity, reducing the complexity of multiple participants. The DB 
entity is required to guarantee a fixed price to the contractor for both design and 
construction, meaning that performance-related risks are transferred away from the owner, 
as long as the contract and performance period covers the entire design life of the 
infrastructure. The selection of the winning entity is made based on technical merit and 
price, rather than lowest cost alone.  
Due to the nature of the DB contract, the designer receives input from the 
constructor during the design phase, which allows for an overlap of the design and 
construction phases. This often leads to projects completed under a DB contract to be faster 
than those under a CMAR or DBB contract. The overlapping of phases also leads to some 
construction related decisions taking place after the design phase, which contributes to both 
the faster deliver time and the lower overall design risk. However, there is a risk that a 
design change is proposed after construction has commenced. In such cases, the entity that 
initiates the change will bear its risk. For example, if a change in design is required because 
of faulty designs by the DB entity, then it will have to bear this risk. This chapter provides 
a summary of the different traditional project delivery methods that are commonly used, 
which are DBB, CMAR and DBB. They are compared with each other, by detailing the 
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advantages and disadvantages of each for the purpose of ultimately comparing with a PPP, 
in order to justify the use of a PPP as a project delivery method. It was found, from both 
the literature review as well as the discussion in this chapter, that a PPP can offer significant 
benefits, particularly when the public entity does not have the necessary funds to procure 
the project. Moreover, PPPs offer the advantage of transferring project risks to the entity 
that is best able to handle them. Finally, PPPs can also offer the advantage of efficiency 
and expertise in undertaking a project.  
After establishing the need for a PPP, its financial viability must be studied. The 
following chapter will provide the first step in the financial viability framework proposed 
by this Thesis, and will discuss the main inputs to the framework proposed in this Thesis. 
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5. INPUTS TO THE FRAMEWORK: PROJECT INFORMATION 
Assessing the financial viability of a PPP project is very much dependent on the 
specifics of each project. PPPs mainly differ in duration, scope, contract type, financial 
structure, and risk sharing. This chapter will discuss the differences related to concession 
length, project scope, PPP arrangements, and financial structure, as well as their impact on 
the outcome of a project’s financial viability. 
 
5.1  Concession Term 
When the PPP contract is being agreed between the SPV and the public entity, the 
interests of both parties need to be addressed. One contractual feature that plays a 
significant role in the interests of the partners, and ultimately in the financial viability of 
the project as a whole, is the length of the concession, or the concession term. The 
concession term is usually determined after analyzing the project’s cash flow, in order to 
provide ample time for the private sector to generate revenues for the repayment of debt, 
and make a profitable return on its investment. In addition, the public will want to define 
the length of PPP projects so as to incentivize good asset management (FHWA, 2010). The 
public sector will aim to select a duration that allows for a balance between its objectives 
and those of the private sector. While governments should provide the private sector with 
the ability to regain all of what it has invested in the asset, while also generating profits, it 
should also not forgo potential revenues for more than the necessary duration to provide 
users with the required service (FHWA, 2010).  
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5.1.1 CONCESSION TERM OPTIONS 
 
The FHWA has identified three main concession term options that public sectors 
consider when deciding on the duration of a PPP project: fixed, dynamic, and extendable. 
A fixed project duration is one in which a specified term is set by legislation or in 
negotiations with the concessionaire. In Texas, for example, the maximum allowable 
duration for a concession project is 52 years (TxDOT, 2015). The fixed term is usually set 
to be greater than the asset life of the project, which would allow the private entity to accrue 
depreciation and tax benefits. A dynamic concession term does not end at a pre-specified 
date, but rather when a pre-specified target is met. For example, a concessionaire might 
agree to end a concession when it has entirely repaid its debt for the project. The dynamic 
term usually ends when an agreed rate of return is achieved, when debt is repaid, or when 
other pre-determined milestones occur. Extendable terms are usually offered as a possible 
compensation option when the fixed concession term expires, but the concessionaire 
requires some sort of compensation from the public sector. For example, the California 
Department of Transportation offered an extension to the concession in order to 
compensate the Presidio Parkway concessionaire for delayed costs or extra work costs 
(FHWA, 2010).  
 
 
5.1.2 DETERMINING THE CONCESSION TERM 
 
As previously stated, one common method used to determine the length of the 
contract in a PPP agreement is based on the project’s cash flows. The concession term is 
usually selected to ensure that the private partner is able to generate the necessary revenues, 
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while also maintaining adequate service to the taxpayers. In addition, there are two other 
methods found in literature that have also been used to determine the length of the 
concession. The first is the use of game theory whereby the concession term is negotiated 
in a dynamic process. The process continues, as each party will attempt to maximize its 
benefits, before settling on a length that satisfies both parties’ basic requirements. The 
second strategy is the use of simulation, such as Monte Carlo Simulation. The different 
variables that affect the choice of concession length, including the NPV, capital investment, 
revenue streams, discount rate, risks, and construction period, are simulated to determine 
the optimal concession length that will provide a ‘win-win’ situation for both parties 
(Carbonara, Costantino, & Pellegrino, 2014; Peng, Cui, & Chen, 2014). Furthermore, 
simulation models attempting to find a concession period that is of lower risk to the private 
partner were also developed using the minimum, expected, and maximum internal rate of 
return (IRR) (Ng, Xie, Cheung, & Jefferies, 2007).   
The concession term is one of the main inputs in the financial viability analysis of 
any project. It is also one of the most important elements of a PPP agreement, since its 
value is a main determinant of the gains or losses of both partners in the agreement. 
 
5.2  PPP Arrangements 
PPP contracts can be structured in many ways, with differing levels of authority 
given to each party, and different risk levels attributed in each agreement. The contract 
types also determine the revenue sources of the private party, and how payments are made. 
To illustrate these points, the following common contract types will be discussed along 
with their main differences: 
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 Services Contract 
 Operations and Maintenance Contract 
 Design Build (DB) 
 Build Operate Transfer (BOT) 
 Design Build Finance Operate Maintain (DBFOM) 
 Concession 
 
Figure 5.1 below, based on Delmon (2010), shows the different degrees of control 
between the private and public sector, as well as the different management responsibilities, 
of each PPP arrangement. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Comparison of Public and Private Sector Involvement in PPP Arrangements 
(Delmon, 2010) 
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5.2.1 SERVICES CONTRACT 
 
A service contract is a common type of PPP arrangement, and in fact, it is the most 
used PPP arrangement in Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2008). With a service contract, 
the public authority hires a private entity to complete contracted tasks at a fixed budget, 
and typically according to performance standards. Such contracts are typically short term, 
whereby the public authority retains ownership of the asset, while paying the private 
partner a pre-determined fee. This type of contract is typically used when support services 
are required, such as customer services and billing on toll roads, for example. Service 
contracts are also used in the utilities sector, in which laying pipes or purchasing spare 
parts are necessary. Most importantly, this type of contract is selected when it is believed 
that the private entity would improve the efficiency of the work. It is also the case that 
several service contracts are signed by a public entity, either for the same project or for 
multiple projects, and therefore a strong enforcement of the contract laws is required, in 
addition to the ability to manage several contracts. 
 
5.2.2 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE CONTRACT 
 
An operations and maintenance (O&M) arrangement involves a public partner 
contracting the operations and maintenance of a facility to a private entity. Under this type 
of agreement, the public partner would retain ownership and management of the facility. 
One variation to the O&M arrangement includes contracting out management of the facility 
to a private partner. The public entity would also retain ownership of the facility in this 
case, but it opens the door for the private partner to invest its own money in the project 
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(PPP Council, 2015; World Bank, 2014; GAO, 1999). This type of agreement is common 
in wastewater treatment services.  
 
5.2.3 DESIGN BUILD 
 
A design build (DB) contract is one in which the public sector agrees with a private 
partner to design and construct an infrastructure asset. The private partner does not own 
the asset at any point, and immediately after the facility is built, it is handed over to the 
public partner. Therefore, a DB contract is usually agreed when a new facility is to be built 
(World Bank, 2014; NCPP, 2015; GAO, 1999) . 
 
5.2.4 BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER 
 
In a build-operate-transfer contract (BOT), the private partner builds a facility, and 
operates it for a brief period of time before transferring it to the public entity. The private 
partner is usually paid for its services by the public entity, rather than receiving revenues 
from the users directly, which means that the revenue risks of the facility lie with the public 
partner. At the end of the contract period, the facility is transferred to the public sector, 
which in turn assumes the revenue-related risks of the project. BOT projects are most 
common when developing new infrastructure assets  such as a dam or power plant, rather 
than an existing asset, and are one of the most common PPP contract types in Europe and 
Asia (World Bank, 2014).  
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One variant of the BOT approach is the build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) 
contract. In a BOOT agreement, the ownership of the facility is temporarily shifted to the 
private partner for the length of the concession during which the project’s revenue risks are 
transferred to the private entity. Another variation is the build-own-operate (BOO) 
approach, in which the private partner owns the facility until it decides to sell it off after a 
certain period of time. With a BOO, the revenue risks lie with the private partner, similar 
to BOOT (Menheere & Pollalis, 1996).  
 
5.2.5 DESIGN BUILD FINANCE OPERATE MAINTAIN 
 
A design build finance operate maintain (DBFOM) contract is usually agreed when 
the private partner is expected to handle the responsibilities of designing, building, 
financing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure. Even though the specifics of 
DBFOM contracts can vary, most of the private partner’s revenue streams are from direct 
user fees, such as tolls, while availability payments have also been used. In order to finance 
the project, the private entity leverages future revenues to raise debt in order to finance the 
project (FHWA, 2010; PPP Council, 2015; Infrastructure Australia, 2008; World Bank, 
2014).  
Two other forms of the DBFOM contract exist; whereby one or more of the services 
offered by the private partner differ. Examples of such forms are DBFO and DBFOMT. In 
a DBFO contract, the private partner does not assume the responsibility for maintaining 
the facility, and thus is relieved of the maintenance risk associated with the project. Another 
form of the DBFOM exists, in which the private partner owns the facility during the length 
of the contract and transfers it back to the public sector afterwards. This arrangement, 
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referred to as a DBFOMT, is common abroad; however, it has rarely been used in the 




A concession involves leasing a facility to a private partner who operates and 
maintains the facility for a certain time period, during which they have the right to collect 
tolls. One of the most important criteria for awarding a bid to a private partner is the 
concession fee that is paid to the government. In addition, other important criteria include 
the length of the concession and the credit worthiness and expertise of the private partner 
(FHWA, 2014; PPP Council, 2015; NCPP, 2015; GAO, 1999; Asian Development Bank, 
2008; World Bank, 2014). 
The arrangements discussed above do not exhaust the full spectrum of possible PPP 
agreements that can be structured. The study of the different forms that a PPP can take is 
essential in determining the risk that each party will bear in the agreement (World Bank, 
2014). As such, careful consideration needs to be used in determining the ideal structure 
for each project. As projects vary, so do their needs, requirements, and complexities; 
therefore, each project will need a careful analysis on what PPP arrangement to choose. 
This means that there is not one PPP contract that suits all projects, and the work involved 
in structuring a PPP agreement should be handled with the utmost care. 
The definitions of the different PPP arrangements are not always clearly defined in 
the literature, and participants must be aware of any laws that the host country might have 
that clearly define these arrangements. Therefore, in constructing the optimal PPP 
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agreement for each project, legal advice must be consulted to understand the full 
implications of all decisions made.  
The ultimate goal of a PPP arrangement is to allow a certain project to flourish in 
ways that each partner would not have been able to achieve alone. Therefore, in structuring 
the PPP arrangement, success is based on the appropriate distribution of risks that forms 
proper co-dependency between the partners, allowing each to achieve their goals 
(European Commission, 2003). For this reason, the PPP structure is a crucial first step in 
embarking on a successful partnership between the public and private sectors.  
 
5.3  PPP Financing 
Prior to bidding on any project, the private partner must have a secured funding 
source that will enable them to procure the project. There are several sources of funding 
for PPP private partners, which are subdivided into two main categories: public funds and 
private funds. The public sector offers funding options that could be used in PPP projects, 
which are mainly in the form of grants. The private sector also offers several funding 
alternatives, and it is the main financier of PPP projects. In addition to obtaining funds 
from lenders, the private partner can also rely on the project’s revenue streams for funding, 
and this is referred to as project finance. The funding sources will be discussed further in 
this section, in addition to the concept of project finance (Finnerty, 2013).  
 
5.3.1 PROJECT FINANCING 
 
The term “project finance” refers to raising the funds for a project solely based on 
its cash flow, and on a limited or nonrecourse basis. The project stakeholders create a 
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special purpose vehicle (SPV), which is a separate entity created for a particular project 
and to secure funds for that project, in order to isolate themselves from the financial risks 
that the project may bring (Reuters, 2015). That is, the SPV secures debt based on the 
project’s cash flows, without relation to the parent companies’ activities. By doing that, the 
parent companies are shielded from the potential financial risks that may occur as part of 
the project. For example, if a project’s cash flows fail to secure the necessary funds to repay 
its debt obligations, and the SPV declares bankruptcy, the parent companies’ balance sheets 
will not be affected. Moreover, by borrowing off the parent companies’ balance sheets, the 
parent company’s borrowing capacity is not affected, allowing it to undertake more 
projects at the same time.  
Project financing is used when a project is able to function independently and based 
on its own cash flows, and this is a requirement that lenders will seek before agreeing to 
invest in the project. Some examples of project assets that have been financed on a project 
basis, as part of a project financing scheme, electric generating facilities, hydroelectric 
projects, wastewater treatment plants, and toll roads. 
Project finance has been a common feature of PPP projects and a preferred method 
for raising long-term debt financing. In addition, the high costs associated with project 
financing make it unsuitable for short-term, smaller scale projects (FHWA, 2013). Several 
benefits exist that encourage the private partner to use project finance as a method to raise 
funds, and they include higher leverage, risk limitation, and non-recourse financing.  
Leverage is referred to as the amount of debt used to finance the project (Ehrhardt 
& Irwin, 2004). Allowing a higher level of debt, as opposed to requiring a higher amount 
of equity, makes it easier for the private company to achieve return on equity and the 
required equity internal rate of return.. In addition, raising equity is more troublesome than 
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raising debt given that more investors might need to be included in the project, making this 
an additional advantage to high leverage.  
Risks of a PPP project can also be limited when using project finance. The inclusion 
of a number of investors creates a risk sharing mechanism in which the consequences of 
risks are shared among the investors. However, increasing the number of partners also 
means that profits have to be shared among them, which ultimately leaves less profit for 
each of the partners. Therefore, despite the fact that risk is hedged when the number of 
partners is increased, less profit will remain for the stakeholders.  
Lending at the project level without regard to the balance sheets of its parent 
companies, as previously mentioned, offers one of the greatest advantages of project 
finance. This keeps all of the project-related financial risks off the parent companies’ 
balance sheets, and also allows the SPV to borrow the required funds depending on the 
project’s own financial viability, regardless of the existing financial situation of the parent 
companies.  
 
5.3.2 FUNDING SOURCES 
This section describes the various funding sources that are used to fund PPP 
projects. Urban PPP projects are capital-intensive and require a large amount of funds for 
the project to be procured. There are different funding sources and mechanisms that the 
project partners can consult to secure funding for the projects. They include public and 




5.3.2.1 Public vs. Private Funds 
 
Both public and private entities combine to provide funds for PPP projects. They 
both invest in different capacities and with different purposes. While the private sector’s 
main purpose is to generate attractive revenues, the public sector aims to achieve the best 
value for money. The following section provides a brief description of the public and 
private funds used in a PPP project.  
 
5.3.2.1.1 Public Funds 
 
The involvement of the public sector in funding PPP projects depends mainly on 
its role in the partnership and on the contract type. The government may choose to fund 
the project in its entirety and utilize the private sector’s expertise in the project 
procurement. This could be the case in contract types in which the private partner is not 
required to provide financing for the project, such as a DBFOM, and a BOT.  
In other cases, the public sector will require the private partner to provide all or part 
of the funding for the project; however, it still contributes to the funding process. One way 
this can be done is through offering grants to the private entity, and can be either in-kind 
or in cash. Grants are often accompanied by several conditions that must be met before the 
project receives funding, and some of those are related to the amount of equity that a partner 
contributes to the project. Another option in which the public sector could get involved in 
the funding of PPPs could be through loans, in which the government offers lower than the 
market interest rates on loans. This is true for private activity bonds (PABs), which are 
bonds issued by governments to support private investments (FHWA, 2015). Equity can 
also be provided by the government, in which it helps fund a shortfall that the private 
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partner may need in order to procure a project. Fees, that the private partner would have 
otherwise been required to pay, can be waived by the government to relieve the private 
entity from some of the project costs. This money is often paid by the government’s own 
budget, and it is used to remove any demand-related risks from the private sector.  
 
5.3.2.1.2 Private Funds 
 
The private sector, apart from the private partner in the PPP agreement, also 
contributes to the funding of the project. The involvement of the private sector is mainly 
in the form of private lenders, who loan the project funds that it expects to be repaid after 
a certain period of time. The main lenders to a PPP project are commercial banks, 
institutional investors, bondholders, and, as previously identified, the host government. 
Commercial banks have emerged as the preferred source of debt for PPP projects, mainly 
due to their willingness to fund long-term projects, and their flexibility in renegotiating the 
loan terms during the project life-cycle. Institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
investment banks, and insurance companies, also invest in PPP projects. They either 
provide direct loans to the project, or they resort to purchasing project bonds. Both 
commercial banks and institutional investors may also prefer to act as equity investors to a 
project if they are willing to accept higher risks in return for higher rewards. 
 
5.3.2.2 Debt vs. Equity 
 
The primary forms of funding PPP projects are debt (senior and subordinated) and 
equity. Each project differs in the amount of funding that is received from each source, but 
 37 
commonalities can be found among all projects. The following section will further detail 
the instruments that the previously discussed public and private funds are put into to fund 




As previously indicated, the main debt lenders to PPP projects are commercial 
entities such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. Commonly, commercial 
banks offer long term loans to the project company, while insurance companies and 
pension funds purchase project bonds. Governments also take part in the debt financing of 
PPP projects through offering loans or purchasing project bonds. Regardless of the 
financing mechanism, the debt can be classified as either senior or subordinated, that is, 
they differ in the priority of repayment. Senior debt has priority over all types of debt in 
terms of repayment, while subordinated debt, or mezzanine debt, is at a junior position. 
Therefore, it is common for mezzanine debt lenders to require higher rates of return, due 
to their acceptance of a higher default risk. However, both senior and subordinated debts 
have a higher repayment priority than equity investors.  
The decision whether to lend to a project, and how much to lend, depends on the 
project company’s credit-worthiness, if the project is not structured as project finance, and 
on the project’s own cash flows and inherent risks. Lenders will seek assurances from the 
project company that the project can generate enough revenues to repay the debt; therefore, 
lenders require the project company to invest a certain amount of equity into the project. 
The proportion of debt that makes up the total project funding varies from one project to 
another, but it is commonly more than half of the total funds. A common measure that 
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lenders will use to assess how much to invest in a project is the annual debt service cover 
ratio (ADSCR). The ADSCR is used to measure the project company’s ability to repay its 
debts by looking at the net income of the project. In general, the ADSCR is represented as 
a ratio of net operating income to total debt service, and an ADSCR greater than 1 means 
that the project entity is able to repay its debts from the project’s operating income.  
The size of the project can help determine the number of lenders as there could be 
more than one debt provider to the project. For example, a group of banks may combine 
their resources to fund a certain project, and they will be referred to as a syndicate. The 
banks will look at forming a syndicate to pool together their resources as well as sharing 




Equity investors, such as the private entity project sponsors, commercial lenders, 
or governments, seek to purchase shares in the SPV in order to provide funding for PPP 
projects, in exchange for ownership of the SPV. Structuring the equity in a PPP is important 
to ensure proper risk allocation and profit-sharing mechanisms. Moreover, the presence of 
equity in the project’s financial structure sends a message to lenders that the project’s 
shareholders have belief in its ability to succeed.  
One main drawback of investing in equity is that it is expensive. Equity is at the 
lowest position in terms of repayment; therefore, the return rate on equity that is required 
by investors is usually higher than that of debt lenders. Furthermore, equity investors bear 
the highest amount of risk among project stakeholders, due to their position at the bottom 
of the repayment hierarchy.  
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Companies are often faced with the decision on how much debt to acquire for a 
project, and how much equity to invest. Several benchmarks are used to describe the trend 
of how much to invest in debt versus equity; and one of the most commonly used ratios is 
the debt to equity ratio (D/E), described further in another section (best to list the section 
for reference purposes) in this Thesis. For large-scale capital-intensive projects associated 
with high costs, the proportion of debt used is generally much higher than that of equity. 
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6. PROJECT CASH FLOW 
 
One of the core efforts in determining the viability of a PPP project is assessing the 
project’s costs and revenues streams. In most PPP arrangements, the private partner will 
be involved in the construction of the facility, while also taking over operations and 
maintenance. In analyzing the costs and revenues of a project, several analysis techniques 
are usually employed. First, the costs and revenues need to be determined, then the viability 
of the project is determined using a discount rate and determining the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of the project. The project’s life-cycle is usually analyzed in two different stages: 
the construction phase and the operations phase, and the different costs and revenues are 
determined for each phase according to the classifications discussed as follows.  
 
6.1  Costs 
The costs in PPP projects are not dissimilar to those of other infrastructure projects. 
The responsibilities of each partner in either of the two phases depend heavily on the 
contract signed and the type of PPP chosen. However, regardless of the responsibilities 
agreed upon, each stage has costs that one of the two parties will have to cover. In the 
construction phase, the general costs of building the infrastructure need to be taken into 
account. In this phase, several aspects can be contracted out to subcontractors. It is typical 
to find subcontractors who are responsible for the construction of the facility, along with 
handling procurement costs. Such activities could include construction, procuring and 
setting up toll gantries, as well as any other necessary infrastructure work.  
Different types of costs are incurred during the procurement of an infrastructure 
project. These costs can be grouped into categories, and after their identification, e the costs 
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can be measured or estimated, analyzed, and possibly reduced. The different cost types that 
could be realized during a project include: 
 
 Life-cycle costs 
 Future and opportunity costs 
 Direct, indirect, and overhead costs 
 Fixed and variable costs 
 
Categorizing costs is useful when  analyzing the different costs to  extract 
information  in order to potentially  lower the costs A brief description of the different costs 
types is provided below according to a review of (World Bank; ADB; IDB, 2014; Delmon, 
2010; Savas E. , 2000; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2014).. 
 
6.1.1 LIFE-CYCLE COSTS 
 
Costs are expected to arise during the different stages of a project, and the life-cycle 
costs are simply the summation of all the costs that occur from the project’s initiation until 
its closure. The different life-cycle costs that are typical and common among infrastructure 
projects include initial investment costs, operating and maintenance costs, and disposal 
costs. These costs are subdivided according to the specific time periods associated with  the 
project’s life cycle.  
The initial investment costs include the investment costs, preparation, fabrication, 
transportation of construction materials, equipment, and project site offices,, and other 
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relevant initial expenditures that take place at the onset of the project and during the 
construction phase.  
The operating and maintenance costs occur during the lifetime of the project, after 
initial construction and before possible disposal. The costs are all those that are necessary 
to operate and maintain the infrastructure during its lifetime, and include personnel costs, 
payments to subcontractors, depreciation, insurance, debt service, and taxes. 
Disposal costs are those that occur at the end of the project’s life cycle, and they 
include the costs of removing equipment, and any costs related to the transfer of ownership. 
At the end of the project, there might also be a salvage value, which could be recovered 
from the removal, sale or scrapping of certain equipment or land. 
 
6.1.2 FUTURE AND OPPORTUNITY  
 
Other costs that are difficult to include in one of the three life-cycle cost categories 
include future and opportunity. Future costs might be due to the replacement of equipment 
future operating and maintenance costs and disposal costs that may arise during the 
project’s lifetime. Also, since there is an investment involved in infrastructure 
procurement, which means there is an opportunity cost to that investment. When an 
investment decision is involved it means another investment is forgone, and the opportunity 





6.1.3 DIFFERENT COST CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
While it is most common to classify costs in PPP projects depending on what stage 
of the life-cycle they occur, there are other classification methods available. Two common 
ways these are classified are direct or indirect, and whether fixed or variable.  
 
6.1.3.1 Direct, Indirect, and Overhead Costs 
 
Costs could also be attributed to a specific cause, regardless of when they occur 
during a project’s life-cycle; these costs are referred to as direct costs. While direct costs 
could be assigned to a specific operation, there are also indirect costs that cannot easily be 
allocated to a specific operation. Examples of direct costs include cost of materials, labor, 
and production-related expenses. On the other hand, examples of indirect costs include 
depreciation and administrative expenses. Moreover, a third cost description is referred to 
as overhead costs, which also cannot be attributed to a specific operation, but are ongoing 
business costs. Overhead represents all business expenses that are not related to direct labor 
or direct materials, and might include rent, utilities, and insurance. Overhead costs can be 
fixed or variable, as discussed further in the following section. Overhead costs are 






6.1.3.2 Fixed and Variable Costs 
 
Another classification of costs that makes cost analysis more beneficial, is 
segmenting based on fixed versus variable costs. Both fixed and variable costs can be 
direct, indirect, or overhead costs. Fixed costs are those that do not change during the 
project’s life cycle, and remain constant regardless of the work performed. Such costs may 
include administrative salaries, property taxes, insurance, and capital costs. On the other 
hand, there are costs that do change with the amount of work performed, and they vary 
depending on the project’s operation. Such costs may include costs of direct material and 
direct labor.  The study of fixed vs. variable costs will help the decision makers understand 
the profitability of increased production by knowing at what point the project will break 
even. This is done by using breakeven analysis, which measures how many units must be 




𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
 (6.1) 
 
For example, on a highway toll-road project, it will be important to understand the 
breakeven traffic volume needed to cover the fixed costs of the project. The variable costs 
per output shown in Equation 6.1 will refer to costs that would increase if more vehicles 
use the facility, such as maintenance costs. The revenue per unit is the toll revenue that is 
collected per vehicle. The fixed costs refer to all the costs that do not change if more 
vehicles use the facility, such as administrative salaries and financing costs.  Another point 
that should be made for the purpose of clarification is that the concept of “fixed” is relative, 
meaning that small changes or fluctuations could still be observed even if a cost is classified 
as “fixed.” For example, while administrative salaries might increase during the project 
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lifecycle due to staff getting promoted, those effects will only have a small variation on the 
overall administrative salaries, and they are independent of the work output.  
 
6.2  Revenues 
The revenues from PPP projects depend heavily on the type of contract, and as 
mentioned in the previous section, the type of PPP arrangement dictates the revenue 
streams that the private entity will receive from the government body. It is common to 
receive revenues from one of two sources: from the public entity or from the users directly. 
In the former, the revenues are either pre-determined in the contract and paid as a lump 
sum, or are based on the performance of the private partner, and are considered as 
availability payments. On the other hand, the private entity can also receive revenues from 
the users of the facility or service directly. The types of revenues also differ by sector, and 
in some cases, it is not possible to charge users for a service or a facility usage. The 





In some cases, the users of a service or facility will be required to pay an extra 
amount in return for improved services. One example is a toll paid by the user is a toll-
road. While there is a general hesitation towards accepting tolls, charging users for services 
has been growing in recent times. The fees that the users are charged have traditionally 
been established in the contract, as the public entity wants to ensure  that taxpayers are not 
being priced out of using a certain facility or service. Also, the contract duration will be 
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impacted by the fact that the private partner is receiving fees from users, in which the length 
of the contract should be set to allow the private operator to generate a return on the 
investment. Finally, with a user-based fee model, the private partner will assume all 




As opposed to the user-based fee concept, the private partner may receive its 
revenues from the government. This revenue model is generally more common than a user-
based fee, in which governments generally enter into contracts with the private sector 
promising payments depending on the availability of the facility. This form of payment is 
commonly referred to as availability payment, and it can be found across all urban 
infrastructure sectors. As such, with this arrangement, the public authority shoulders 
demand-related risks.  
 
6.2.3 INDIRECT REVENUES: ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 
After determining the costs and revenues over the lifetime of the project, they are 
discounted using a pre-determined discount rate. If the NPV is calculated to be greater than 
or equal to zero, then the project would make sense financially. However, if several projects 
are to be assessed, and only one must be chosen, then the project with the highest NPV 
must be chosen (Cruz & Marquez, 2013; Asian Development Bank, 2010).  
Some projects also lead to revenues being generated, but are not directly collected 
by the project developers, and sometimes cannot be specifically attributed to the project at 
 47 
hand. Nevertheless, the emergence of a project in an urban setting can bring benefits to the 
community, without appearing on the SPV’s financial statements. In calculating a project’s 
financial viability, these revenues need to be accounted for, especially by the public sector, 
because in some cases, if a PPP arrangement were not used, the project would not have 
been procured at all (Cruz & Marquez, 2013; Asian Development Bank, 2010).  
Some examples of indirect revenues that may occur due to a PPP project in an urban 
area mainly include sales of land and area development. If, for example, a school or a 
public transit terminal was built in a certain area, and housing growth in that area increased 
thereafter, then the revenues generated to land owners and the government could be 
attributed, in part, to this project. Moreover, if the project were procured under a PPP 
arrangement, with the PPP being the only available option at the time, then this would be 
an example of indirect revenues being generated as a result of a PPP project (Asian 
Development Bank, 2010). 
In addition, the private sector could also realize indirect revenues from participating 
in a PPP arrangement. If, for example, a private partner is awarded a contract for a large-
scale project, and having that project as part of its portfolio enhances its reputation, then it 
could help the private partner in securing future jobs. This could be attributed as indirect 
revenue for PPPs, when considering that the project would not have been procured under 
traditional methods.  
Even though it may be difficult to quantify indirect revenues, and to directly 
attribute them to a single project, they could present a notable advantage of a PPP project. 
In assessing the financial viability of a PPP project, the quantification and inclusion of the 
indirect revenues could provide a better picture of a project’s profitability.  
This chapter provided an overview of the project cash flow for a PPP project. The 
different elements necessary to study the project cash flow and, ultimately, the financial 
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viability of a project. Revenue and cost components were discussed in detail, and were 
identified for use in future sections of this Thesis after they are adjusted for risk. The 
following chapter will detail the risk management procedure described in the 
methodological framework of this thesis, and will serve as a method to adjust the revenue 
and cost components presented in this chapter based on their risk exposure in order to 





Risk is the possible occurrence of an event that has positive or negative impacts on 
a project. There are different ways to classify risks on a project; however, regardless of 
their classification, common risk elements need to be evaluated when assessing risks 
according to Kliem and Luden (1997), and are listed as follows: 
 
 Probability of occurrence 
 Frequency of occurrence 
 Impact of occurrence 
 Importance relative to other risks 
 
These elements are important in identifying, analyzing, controlling, and reporting 
risks. However, measuring each of these elements is not simple; several techniques have 
been developed in order to arrive at an estimate of the effects of risks and in turn support 
effective risk management (Kliem & Ludin, 1997). 
Risk management is essential to the success of a project. Managing risks involves 
several different steps, including risk identification, risk analysis, risk control and risk 
reporting (Kliem & Ludin, 1997; Heinze, 1996).  
 
7.1  Risks in PPPs 
As part of a PPP structure, risks are also related to the uncertainty of outcomes. In 
a PPP agreement, there exists a risk of failure to realize an outcome, which could be related 
to the delivery of the project on time or the realization of acceptable revenues, meaning 
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that there is a cost associated with risks in PPP projects. Therefore, in such cases, the nature 
of a PPP, which allows the transfer of risks from one party to the other, determines who 
will be responsible for these risk costs.  
Public-private partnerships offer the advantage of transferring risks from one party 
to the other, mainly from the public to the private partner, to be better able to execute a 
project (Akintoye, Hardcastle, & Beck, 2003). Risk sharing is an essential component of 
structuring a PPP agreement, as it can be the difference between a successful and a failed 
project (Jin & Doloi, 2008). In fact, risk allocation and sharing was identified as one of the 
most important factors that contribute to the success of a PPP project (Ke, Wang, & Chan, 
2010). Currently, large infrastructure projects experience significant under-management of 
risks during all stages of the project life cycle. According to a report published by 
McKinsey & Company in 2013, “direct value losses due to under-management of risks for 
today’s pipeline of large-scale projects may exceed $1.5 trillion in the next five years, not 
to mention the loss in GDP growth as well as reputational and societal effects.”  
In general, the public entity will look to transfer risks that it is not able to handle to 
its private partner, but governments must not attempt to transfer too much risk to the private 
partner (Cangiano, Hemming, & Ter-Minassian, 2004). One reason for that is if the private 
partner assumes too much risk but is not prepared or equipped to handle the risk, the 
success of the project may be jeopardized. Another reason is if the government expects the 
private partner to assume too much risk, then it risks losing potential investors in the future. 
 
7.2  Risk Identification 
One of the most important tasks in managing risks is risk identification, as a failure 
to realize the existence of a risk is detrimental to a project’s outcomes (McKinsey, 2013). 
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Effective risk management involves initially identifying risk. Despite its importance early 
on in the project life cycle, it should be an ongoing process until the end of the project 
(McKinsey, 2013; Akintoye, Hardcastle, & Beck, 2003).  
Since there are different risks associated with PPP agreements, various general 
methods have been used to classify those risks. Some of the classifications are listed as 
follows (Cangiano, Hemming, & Ter-Minassian, 2004; Hall, 1998; Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Pantelias, 2009): 
 Acceptable vs. non-acceptable,  
 Short-term vs. long-term,  
 Positive vs. negative,  
 Manageable vs. non-manageable, and  
 Internal vs. external  
 General/Country vs. Project-specific 
 Development vs. Construction vs. Operation vs. Ongoing  
 
Risks are not always strictly classified according to one of these methods; their 
classification could involve more than one of the listed methods. The various risks common 
to PPP projects are briefly discussed as follows (Yescombe, 2007; Hardcastle & 
Boothroyd, 2003; World Bank, 2014; Infrastructure Australia, 2008).  
 
7.2.1 CONSTRUCTION RISK 
 
The cost of constructing a facility is a main determinant of the financial viability of 
a project, in which uncertainty around its outcome can affect the investment decision. 
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Managers attempt to address anticipated price escalations to make sure the cost of 
completion is in line with the anticipated budget. Cost overruns can severely impact the 
project’s financial stature, resulting in increased debt ratios, which will in turn alert future 
lenders and could cause the cost of borrowing to increase.  
In addition to cost overruns, construction risk is also present due to delays and 
substandard performance, both of which contribute to prolonging the construction phase, 
and delaying revenue streams for the private company.  
 
7.2.2 INVESTMENT RISK: DEMAND, REVENUE, AND MAINTENANCE RISKS 
 
Investment risk is a term referring to demand, revenue, and maintenance risks, all 
of which affect each other, and affect the investment in the project. These risks are 
particular to the operations phase of the PPP, during which the project company receives 
the majority of its revenues. Therefore, it is a type of financial risk, and failures resulting 
from lower than expected demand and revenue could negatively affect the project’s 
financial viability. Also, considering that any maintenance will have an effect on roadway 
conditions which in turn affects the users’ propensity to travel on the roadway and 
eventually revenues, this risk is also a type of engineering risk. Other terms that are used 
to refer to risks occurring during the operations phase include usage, network, revenue 
payment, availability, and maintenance. These risks are all part of the investment risk 
definition that is used in this Thesis; they all interact with each other and collectively affect 
the project’s profitability. 
Investment risk incorporates a number of the most common risks that PPP projects 
face. Demand is one of the greatest uncertainties when assessing a project’s financial 
 53 
viability, and the variability associated with the demand of a service can have great effects 
on both the private and public entities (Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, 2009). Moreover, demand is 
the direct contributor to the private party’s revenues in a user-based revenue structure, in 
which the private entity generates its revenues by collecting fees from the users of the 
facility directly. Therefore, changes in demand forecasts will results in changes to the 
project’s revenues and, thus, the viability of the project. For this reason, demand and 
revenue risks are discussed as part of the investment risk of a PPP.  
 
7.2.3 POLITICAL AND LEGISLATIVE RISKS 
 
Changes to legislation that will affect the terms of the PPP agreement and impact 
profit are referred to as legislative risks. The host government could impose tax increases, 
for example, that would heavily disrupt a project’s cash flow, highlighting one aspect of 
the political risks that a PPP project could face. Also, legal restrictions could be applied 
that would reduce a project’s ability to operate efficiently. Additionally, changing the terms 
of a project could have a great impact on its operations. For example, if previously toll 
increases were frozen, then the private partner would not be able to achieve its revenue 
goal it was expecting as part of the past forecasts. Another example could be allowing 
competition, such as an adjacent non-tolled or with lower toll rates, to operate and impact 
demand and consequently revenue streams. Host governments can also cancel projects or 




7.2.4 SITE-SPECIFIC RISKS 
 
Multiple risks are associated with the project site itself, and they are more likely to 
occur early on in the PPP life-cycle. These risks are usually allocated to the public or 
private sector, or are even shared between the two. Some common issues that may arise 
include those related to permits, site geology, and environmental clearance issues, 
discovery of endangered plant or animal species, discovery of archaeologic or historic sites, 
rights of way acquisition, and drainage easements.  Any of these factors can cause 
significant delays to projects, which is associated with high costs. Moreover, the inability 
to acquire a site or a permit to move forward with the project can even lead to the project 
being shut down altogether. 
 
7.2.5 OPERATING RISKS 
 
The operations phase of a PPP is a lengthy one, and in certain cases, it is the only 
phase in which private partners receive revenues. Therefore, disruptions in operating 
activities can have a severe impact on the project’s cash flow. Efficiency reductions during 
the operations phase, such as equipment malfunctions, damage to infrastructure 
components, crashes that close portions or all of a highway for a period of hours or days, 
can disrupt revenue streams, in the energy, telecommunications, and/or transportation 
sectors, for example. Projects are required to operate at a certain level of efficiency for 
services to be provided or for products to be produced. As a result, inefficiencies can 
disrupt a project’s revenue streams, and affect the profitability of a PPP. 
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7.2.6 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISKS 
 
Lenders are major stakeholders in PPP projects as loans provide the majority of 
funding. As a result, one major payment that the borrower has to pay is interest payments 
to the lenders. The amount being paid is heavily affected by the market interest rates, if the 
loan is charged at a floating, or variable, interest rate. Therefore, fluctuations in the market 
interest rate will have a great effect on the cost component of a project’s cash flows, and 
can ultimately affect a project’s financial viability.  
As with the interest risk, changes in currency rates could also pose a challenge to 
PPP stakeholders. Financing could be raised by foreign investors in their own currency, 
but revenues will remain in the local currency. As a result, in project finance PPPs, the 
borrower will have to go through the foreign exchange market (forex) to pay the lenders.  
Furthermore, a project could be impacted by economic factors, depending on the 
specific industry to which it is related. Changes in demand and supply, and pricing of raw 
materials, commodities, and/or products could affect the private entities ability to service 
its debt. In some cases, private partners in PPPs operate at a small profit margin- which 
increases the effect of such economic changes on the profitability of a project.  
 
7.2.7 FORCE MAJEURE RISKS 
 
A force majeure event could be internal to the project or external, but both would 
have an effect on its profitability. Events that are specific to a project include fires, 
technical failures, or strikes. These events are usually out of the control of the private 
partner, but would affect operations. Additionally, external events could occur and would 
also affect the project, such as earthquakes or revolts. In some instances project lenders or 
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governments could help the private partner by providing contract extensions to recover 
revenues or allowing late repayments of debt. 
The allocation of risks to the different parties commonly occurs after the risk 
identification stage and could be performed before, or after, risks are carefully assessed 
(Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, 2009). The following section provides a discussion on risk 
assessment, its importance in risk management, and techniques to assess risks. 
 
7.3  Risk Assessment 
After identifying the risks that could potentially occur during a project’s life cycle, 
the risks should be carefully assessed in order to be properly managed. Risk assessment 
and quantification could indeed prove to be the most challenging part of managing the risks 
of a PPP project. This is due to the various uncertainties associated with such projects, 
resulting in the need to consider a range of possibilities in a probabilistic study of risk. As 
opposed to a deterministic analysis, a probabilistic formulation will consider a range of 
possibilities that might occur, and would also give out a range of possible answers to the 
analyst (Koller, 1999). 
There has been substantial research on risk assessment techniques, especially those 
that take into consideration a range of values instead of discrete, single-valued possibilities. 
Some techniques have not been studied extensively in the assessment of risk in 
infrastructure, but have been more common in other fields such as finance, whereas others 
have been more commonly studied in the context of infrastructure risk assessment. Some 
of the risk assessment techniques that have been studied, not only in infrastructure risk 
management but also across various other fields, include: 
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 Bayesian Analysis 
 Decision Trees 
 Monte Carlo Simulation 
 Method of Moments 
 Artificial Networks 
 Value at Risk 
 
These risk assessment methods represent different options for quantitatively 
analyzing risks in PPP projects, in order to mitigate unexpected costs and complications 
that may occur during the project’s life cycle. The author recommends performing 
sensitivity analysis prior to using any of the identified risk assessment methods. The 
purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to identify which risk factors among the list prepared 
in the risk identification step have a significant impact on the financial viability decision. 
As a result, only those sensitive risk variables will be examined in the risk assessment 
stage. Table 7.1 presents a brief overview of the literature on the work done on these risk 
assessment methods (Haimes, Li, & Tulsiani, 1990; Chua, Kog, Loh, & Jaselskis, 1997; 
Boussabaine & Kaka, 1998; Dey & Ogunlana, 2001; Chau, 1995; Songer, Dickermann, & 
Pescsok, 1997; Yuwen & Zhang, 2013; Zhang & Damnjanovic, 2006) (Han, Stone, & 
Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Damnjanovic, 2006; Mishra, Khasnabis, & Swain, 2015; Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2002; Jin & Zhang, 2011; Chang T. , 2011; Pantelias & Zhang, 2010) (Khan, 
2013; Bouejla, Chaze, Guarnieri, & Napoli, 2014; Boussabaine A. , 2014). A brief 
description of the different methods is then presented below to highlight their strengths, 
weaknesses, and limitations in assessing project risks.  
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Table 7.1 Overview of Research into the Presented Risk Methods 
Method Authors Topic 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
Grimsey & Lewis, 2002 
Dey & Ogunlana, 2001 
Risk analysis on urban water treatment project in Scotland 
Project time risk analysis through simulation 
 Songer et. al, 1997 Project cash flow in toll road project 
 Chau, 1995 Distribution form for cost estimate 
 Yuwen & Zhang, 2013 
 
Estimating overall project risks for a toll road project 




Chua et. al, 1997 Development of budget performance model 
 Jin and Zhang, 2011 Modeling optimal risk allocation in PPP projects using artificial neural 
networks 
 Chang, 2011 Study for digital game content stocks price prediction 
Method of Moments Han, Stone, and Zhang 2014 
 
Zhang and Damnjanovic, 2006 
 
 
Zhang and Damnjanovic, 2006 
 
Pantelias and Zhang, 2009 
Optimizing pavement preventive maintenance cycles 
 
Quantifying the risk cost associated with warranty specifications for 
transportation infrastructure 
 
Modeling reliability of pavements infrastructure 
 
Measuring investment risk in PPP projects 
Bayesian Analysis (Khan, 2013) Risk factors in toll road life cycle analysis 
 (Bouejla, Chaze, Guarnieri, & 
Napoli, 2014) 
Manage Risks of Maritime Piracy against Offshore Oil Fields 
 (Xie & Ng, 2013) Multi-objective Model for Public-Private Partnership Decision Support 
 Boussabaine, 2014 Risk pricing strategies for public-private partnership projects 
Value at Risk Mishra, Khasnabis, and Swain 
(2015) 
Incorporating uncertainty and risk in transportation investment decision-
making 
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7.3.1 BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 
  
Bayesian Analysis provides a method of assessing and quantifying risks using 
probabilities. Its underlying principle is based on updating existing information with new 
information once it becomes available in order to make better-informed decisions, making 
it a powerful risk assessment tool (Koller, 1999; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Stone, 2013; 
Haimes, 1998).  
Bayesian analysis requires the establishment of initial probabilities of occurrence, 
which will be updated once new information is available. The initial probabilities are 
established by gathering data from different sources, and combining the data sets to 
produce a generic data set that could be presented in the form of success or failure rates. 
Updating the data usually involves consulting with subject matter experts, recognizing their 
importance in the decision-making process. The input from the subject matter experts to 
the analysis process makes Bayesian analysis a popular method. 
One example that illustrates how Bayesian analysis is performed is in measuring 
the site-specific risks. Prior to receiving access to the site and being allowed to drill and 
discover its geologic features, there is limited knowledge of the risks. Such risks could 
include, as specified earlier, the issuance of permits, the ground condition, environmental 
issues, and archaeological risks. Therefore, at the onset of the project, the probability of 
occurrence of each will be assigned based on nearby site data and historical data, and will 
be updated once more information becomes available.  
Dollar values can be assigned to the analysis in order to understand the total project 
costs. For example, if the current total project costs are estimated at $1 million, and there 
is 30% a risk that the authorities will not approve the project design, but will require the 
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designer to add features costing an additional  $200,000, this risk cost  will be taken into 
account when estimating the total project cost. The expected value of the total project risk 
cost, therefore, will be calculated by multiplying each value with its probability of 
occurrence, in which the risk of a higher cost will be factored in. That is, the expected value 
of the total project cost is shown in Equation 7.1 below. 
 
𝐸𝑉(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) = 0.7 ∗ $1 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 0.3 ∗ $1.2 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 = $1.06 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 (7.1) 
Equation 7.1 shows that the expected value of the project increases from $1 million 
to $1.06 million, which means that the total risk cost of the project is estimated to be 
$60,000. Figure 7.1 illustrates this example in a graphical format.  
 
Figure 7.1 Example of Bayesian Analysis 
Bayesian analysis is a powerful business and planning tool due to its reliance on 
historical information and allowing the easy incorporation of new data into the analysis. It 
has also provided a platform for other assessment methodologies, such as decision trees, 
as will be described in the following section. One of the main drawbacks of Bayesian 
analysis is the subjectivity that is involved when consulting subject matter experts to obtain 
probabilities of occurrence of certain events. Restricting the information sources to 
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historical data from past projects could mitigate this issue; however, in some cases, such 
historical data might not be available, and subject matter experts will be the best source of 
information. In addition, the use of such a form of Bayesian Analysis is best suited to 
sequential risks, in which a future outcome depends on the outcome of a prior event. This 
is also true for decision trees which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
 
7.3.2 DECISION TREES 
 
Decision analysis plays an important role in analyzing quantitative risk, and the use 
of decision trees offers a practical approach to organizing a decision problem with a finite 
set of actions. It is one of the most commonly used tools in risk-based decision making, 
mainly due to its reliance on a combination of graphic and analytic presentations. The 
graphical part is descriptive, while the analytical part builds on Bayes’ theorem. Error! 
eference source not found. presents a generic decision tree, and its main components are 
further described afterwards (Koller, 1999; Damodaran, 2008; Haimes, 1998). 
The main parts of a decision tree include the decisions that need to be investigated, 
the alternatives present, the probability of occurrence of each alternative, and the 
consequences of choosing each option. These components will be described by using an 
example of choosing a project delivery method, with the objective of achieving the best 
net present value (NPV) and earning the highest profits. 
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Figure 7.2 Example of Decision Tree 
Decision node: A decision node represents the various decisions that the decision 
maker is faced with, in this case, what project delivery method to choose. Attached to it 
are the different available alternatives, such as DBB or PPP in this case. 
Chance node: The chance nodes represent the states of nature of each alternative, 
along with their probabilities of occurrence. For example, a DBB would have a 50 percent 
chance of achieving an NPV that is “low” and a 50 percent chance of a “high” NPV. The 
PPP alternative, on the other hand, has a 30 percent chance of achieving a “low” NPV, and 
a 70 percent chance of a “high” NPV. 
Consequence node: The consequence of each alternative is then calculated based 
on the chance probabilities assigned earlier. Therefore, the consequence of each alternative 
could be represented as the profit that could be generated from each alternative.  
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As can also be noticed from this example, decision trees offer a solution to 
analyzing sequential risks. The choice of project delivery method is made before the project 
realizes revenues and costs, and before the NPV is calculated.. For these reasons, the use 
of decision trees is popular among decision makers, as it offers a flexible but powerful 
method to risk analysis, planning, and mitigation. Moreover, its reliance on the Bayes 
theorem of using prior probabilities to calculate future ones, while being able to update the 
prior probabilities once new information becomes available, adds to its benefits.  
In some cases; the use of decision trees could prove problematic if the risks are not 
sequential and cannot be discretized. This is a problem for a large number of risk factors 
that do not occur sequentially, and the use of decision trees should be avoided in such cases.  
For example,  a decision tree is not suited for risks that might take on a continuous spectrum 
of outcomes. For these types of analyses, a simulation approach to risk assessment would 
be a better option, as discussed in the following section.  
 
7.3.3 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) is a sampling technique that uses the generation of 
random numbers to determine the values of uncertain variables in decision-making 
situations. When a problem is formulated and stochastic variables are identified, MCS is 
used to generate random numbers for these variables based on certain defined distributions. 
MCS It is used as an alternative to the previously discussed decision tree method for 
making decisions.  
In an MCS approach, a mathematical model or equation is constructed that 
describes the relationship among the stochastic variables and the decision under 
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consideration.  Next, for each stochastic variable, possible values of occurrence are 
determined, along with the expected value, standard deviation, and the form of the 
distribution. The mathematical model and the distributions of the stochastic variables form 
the input for the MCS.  For each variable, random numbers are generated according to the 
defined distributions. After each simulation, which includes the random number generation 
of each uncertain variable, a value for the decision is obtained. After thousands of 
simulations, a profile describing the variation of the decision is plotted. 
As previously indicated, MCS uses a distribution of possible inputs to randomly 
generate a range of outputs. One example that illustrates the MSC methodology is a 
simplified case of estimating the profits of an investment. The profits are calculated based 
on the profit equation, whereby costs are deducted from revenues, and both costs and 
revenues can take a range of values depending on certain factors. In estimating profits, the 
revenues and costs need to first be calculated, based on the range of possible values. For 
example, revenues on a toll-road are dependent primarily on the traffic demand and the toll 
rate. The traffic demand is an uncertain variable that can take a range of possible values. 
In this example, it is assumed that the traffic volume has a range of possible outcomes, and 
an expected mean value. It is also assumed that it is normally distributed. In an MSC 
random numbers for traffic volume are generated based on the distribution, and the total 
profits will change once each random number is generated. Similarly, this procedure is 
replicated simultaneously for each uncertain variable that influences the costs and 
revenues. After thousands of concurrent simulations of the uncertain variables, and using 
the profit equation, a distribution of profit values will be obtained and can be analyzed to 
understand the risk profile of the decision under consideration. This enables the decision 
makers to make better-informed decisions based on the amount of risk they are willing to 
accept. 
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One of the main advantages of Monte Carlo Simulation is the ability to model a 
wide range of possible values using a variety of distributions. This helps incorporate a more 
realistic view on the variations in risk parameters, enabling more informed decision-
making. Another advantage is that it offers a probabilistic analysis of risk, in which 
probabilities are assigned to the numbers that are randomly generated, and the output is 
also given as a probability distribution. Also, the graphical representation of answers gives 
Monte Carlo Simulation another advantage. Moreover, Monte Carlo Simulation has the 
ability to perform a simultaneous analysis of all the uncertain variables under 
consideration. However, despite such advantages, Monte Carlo Simulation has some 
disadvantages and limitations. First, its dependence on experts to define distribution 
models for the variables means that if the experts are incorrect the entire analysis will lead 
to inaccurate results.  Monte Carlo Simulation also requires careful determination of the 
correlation among the variables that are being studied, or else the analysis of the project’s 
risk profile could be faulty.  
With the availability of software that can perform Monte Carlo Simulation in a 
relatively short period of time, it is recommended that it be incorporated into the decision 
making process on projects. However, it should be avoided for risk variables that do not 
have known distributions backed by data. If the distributions are determined by experts 
subjectively, then the entire Monte Carlo Simulation process could lead to inaccurate 
estimates of the risk variables (Rezaiea, Amalnika, Gereiea, Ostadib, & Shakhseniaeea, 




7.3.4 ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
 
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a technology that attempts to uncover 
valuable information from large amounts of data. It is considered a branch of artificial 
intelligence, which has the ability to learn certain patterns from inputs and generate outputs. 
ANNs have the ability to recognize patterns, process signals, and predict outcomes, which 
is a fundamental task of risk assessment. Therefore, ANNs offer a powerful and flexible 
tool for risk assessment, which attempts to predict future outcomes by learning available 
past data and the underlying patterns that exist (Chang M. , 2011; Jin & Zhang, 2011; 
Koller, 1999) .  
The typical structure of an ANN consists of different elements that resemble 
functioning elements of the human brain’s nervous system. As in a brain, there are several 
neurons that perform processing functions; they receive information from other neurons, 
process it, and transfer processed information to other neurons. ANN attempts to model 
this functional element of the brain’s nervous system, by constructing processing and 
transferring elements.  
In an ANN, as in the human brain, a neuron-like element receives a weighted piece 
of information from another similar element, carried through a connecting element. Once 
the information is received, the neuron-like element combines it with other pieces of 
information, and based on the resulting weights a signal is fired to another neuron-like 
node. The signal is fired based on whether the weights, or summed weights, exceed a 
certain threshold, and as a result, information is passed on to other stages of the system’s 
structure. Another important and challenging task of constructing the ANN structure, in 
addition to building the artificial neurons, is attempting to understand the interconnections 
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among them. Once these two elements of the ANN are finalized, the system can start its 
learning procedure, which is one of the main features of an ANN.  
ANNs offer a powerful tool to assess risks, by constructing a computer algorithm 
that can recognize patterns from large data sets to produce meaningful information. The 
ability of ANNs to learn and adapt to changing circumstances is one of its main features 
that contribute to its strength. Even though ANNs do not perform probabilistic assessments 
of risk, their contribution can be beneficial to project managers attempting to study project 
risks. 
One example of how ANNs can be used for risk management on PPP projects is 
provided by Jin and Zhang (2011). The paper presents a method for optimal risk allocation 
on PPP projects based on initial data from a survey that was conducted with industry 
experts, and the ANN models were then trained using this data. The results of the study 
show that ANNs provide satisfactory results for modelling risks and their optimal 
allocation. The authors recommended that the PPP partners’ risk management mechanism 
maturity level, their risk management routines, cooperation history, and risk management 
commitment need to be taken into account as they affect the formation of optimal risk 
allocation strategies (Jin & Zhang, 2011). 
The initial connection weights can be set arbitrarily. One of the great attractions of 
ANNs is that they are able to learn: the weights can be adjusted automatically from data. 
To accomplish this, a training set of input data with known answers attached is presented 
to the network. Over the course of a training session, the connection weights are gradually 
adjusted by the neural network itself until they reach convergence. If the training set 
captures the regularities of a wider class of inputs, the trained network will then be able to 
correctly classify inputs not found in the training set as well. Such a process is an example 
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of supervised learning, in which a teacher (the training set) is used to guide the network in 
acquiring the necessary knowledge (connection weights). 
As previously discussed, the learning capability of ANNs is one of the advantages 
that the method offers. In addition, the use of ANNs is beneficial when the relationships 
between the uncertain variables that affect a project decision are not related by a linear 
equation. Therefore, for decisions in which the relationship among variables is complex, 
ANNs offer a more viable solution over traditional statistical methods. In addition, the 
underlying distributions of the variables under study do not need to be known in order to 
conduct an ANN analysis, as is the case with Monte Carlo Simulation method. However, 
ANNs are also associated with some disadvantages, one of which is their complexity. 
Finding the optimal configuration of neural networks for analysis is a time-consuming 
process that makes it less favorable for assessing risks. Another disadvantage is the lack of 
interpretability of the weights that are obtained during the model building process. For 
these reasons, the use of ANNs is best reserved for use among experts who are well 
acquainted with them, in order to be able to avoid suffering from the disadvantages of this 
method that would otherwise make it unattractive when time is a constraint, as is most 
often the case. Also, risks that do not have a certain distribution known to them, and that 
cannot be modeled through the use of Monte Carlo Simulation, can be modeled using the 
ANN method (Mukta Paliwal, 2009; Jin & Zhang, 2011). 
 
7.3.5 METHOD OF MOMENTS 
 
Another probabilistic technique for quantifying risks is the method of moments 
(MOM). It is based on reliability theory, which is concerned with estimating the probability 
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of a system achieving its expected function in a specific time interval. The reliability theory 
has given rise to the structural reliability problem, which can be found while analyzing the 
reliability of structures in the field of civil engineering.  The main objective of reliability 
analysis is making sure that the system does not fail, taking into consideration the variables 
that affect system performance (Damnjanovic, 2006; Zhang & Damnjanovic, 2006; Zhao 
& Ono, 2001; Pantelias & Zhang, 2010).  
As such, a limit state function can be constructed, taking into consideration the 
stochastic random variables that affect the outcome of the system, identified as G(X,Y), 
where X and Y represent vectors of random variables that affect the performance of the 
system. This system, therefore, fails when G(X, Y) < 0, and the probability of failure can 
be identified as 𝑃𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 = Pr{𝐺 (𝑋, 𝑌) < 0}. Assuming continuity and independence of 
the stochastic variables X and Y, the probability of failure can be estimated as the 
probability integral of the joint probability density function (PDF) of the variables X and 
Y, denoted by ℎ(𝑋, 𝑌), over the failure region of the previously stated limit state function, 
as follows: 
 




The above function can be solved using various techniques: Monte Carlo 
Simulation, the first order reliability method (FORM), the second order reliability method 
(SORM), the first order third moment (FOTM) method, and the method of moments. The 
following discussion will involve the MOM and its guiding principles.  
As previously indicated, the MOM is a technique employed to solve multi-
dimensional probability integrals, as the one shown in Equation (7.2). In order to do so, 
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two sequential steps are followed. First, the moments of the limit state function are 
determined, which is done by using point estimates obtained in the standard normal space. 
Second, the reliability index and the failure probability are calculated using the obtained 
moments and standardized functions. 
Zhao and Ono (2001) have developed a methodology for using the MOM to solve 
the limit state function of the structural reliability problem presented in Equation (7.2). In 
order to obtain the higher-order moments of the limit state function, the authors proposed 
the use of an equivalent linear approximation, as shown below: 
 





𝑮𝒊 Functions similar to the limit state function, having all variables 
evaluated at their mean values, except the ith value 
 
𝑮𝝁 𝐺(𝜇), which is the limit state function evaluated at 𝜇, the mean of the 
random variables  
 
The reliability index and failure probability discussed in the second step of the 
process described previously are shown as follows: 
 
𝛽𝐹𝑀 =
3[𝛼4𝐺′ − 1] [
𝜇𝐺′











The first four moments of 𝐺′ presented in the equation can be calculated as follows: 
 





































Where 𝜇𝑖, 𝜎𝑖, 𝜎3𝑖, and 𝜎4𝑖 are the first four moments of 𝐺𝑖 (Zhao & Ono, 2001). 
 
Pantelias (2009) provides evidence of the success of the Method of Moments in 
estimating risk in PPP projects, and particularly, investment risk (Pantelias, 2009). The 
author used the Method of Moments to obtain a probabilistic estimate of investment risk 
in PPP projects, by implementing the method on a real-life toll road case study; the 
previously planned Trans Texas Corridor (TTC-35). The author was able to verify that the 
different parameter values resulting from the sensitivity analysis and alternative scenarios 
were successfully investigated, and provided estimates of the investment risk on the project 
(Pantelias, 2009).  
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The use of the MOM can be used to solve the structural reliability problem, which 
is transferable to other problem types, as long as the reliability equation is defined. The 
MOM is a preferred higher moment statistical method due to the fact that it provides a 
better estimate of the probability of failure. One of the benefits of the method of moments 
is that no distribution for the random variables is required, a clear advantage over Monte 
Carlo Simulation. Another benefit is that it offers a closed-form expression, which does 
not require an indefinite number of iterations to obtain a solution. In addition, it offers an 
accurate estimate when the risk equation is presented as a non-linear expression. (Ma, Si, 
Zhu, & Wang, 2014; Zhang & Damnjanovic, 2006; Zhao & Ono, 2001). Furthermore, the 
MOM employs a mathematically simple and clear evaluation of the probability of failure 
(Zhang & Damnjanovic, 2006).  
 
7.3.6 VALUE AT RISK 
 
One of the leading fields in risk management, and particularly risk analysis, is the 
financial services sector, where there has been much development in quantifying risks. One 
common risk measure that has been used in financial services is value at risk (VaR). The 
essential concept of VaR lies in the use of simulation techniques and probability analysis 
to estimate the worst possible loss that a project or, more commonly in finance, a portfolio 
can lose in a certain period of time with a specific level of confidence (Jorion, 2000; 
Crouhy, Galai, & Mark, 2000; Best, 2000; Damodaran, 2003). 
One of the advantages of VaR over traditional risk measures is that it measures the 
effects of risks of certain assets on others. This is an important consideration if the measure 
is to be transferred and used in the infrastructure sector in which several risk factors must 
 73 
be measured at once. For example, if multiple assets are present in a portfolio then the 
effects of changes in one asset on another asset can be captured. As a result, if one asset is 
associated with a risk of change, then the risk of change of the other asset can also be 
captured. In infrastructure projects the investment risk, as explained earlier, involves 
demand, maintenance, and toll risks, and the effect of each of these risks on the other needs 
to be measured, and for this type of problem, VaR can be used. Moreover, VaR has a 
probability associated with it, making it a probabilistic measurement of risk, giving it an 
advantage over deterministic risk measures (Best, 2000). 
VaR measures the worst possible outcome of an investment, given a certain level 
of confidence, and a time horizon. For example, a bank can lose a maximum of $1 million 
in 24 hours given a 95 percent confidence level. The main steps involved in computing the 
value at risk includes 1) assigning the level of confidence and the time horizon of the 
analysis 2)  assigning a stochastic model that will enable the simulation of random variables 
for use in the analysis. The main purpose of generating the random variables is to estimate 
or model the range of possible scenarios that could occur, with the stochastic model 
assigning the distribution of the simulated variables.   
There have been several VaR measurement techniques that have evolved over the 
years as this measure has gained popularity, particularly in the banking sector. The most 
common techniques used include the variance-covariance method and simulation 
(Damodaran, 2003; Best, 2000; Jorion, 2000; Crouhy, Galai, & Mark, 2000). 
In the variance-covariance method a probability distribution of potential values is 
established, and the VaR is then calculated. The method calculates the mean and standard 
deviation of a portfolio by looking at historical changes, and estimates the VaR. For 
example, if the price change for a commodity, say gold, was found to follow a normal 
distribution, with mean of $100 and standard deviation of $10, then, with 95 percent 
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confidence, the VaR would be $80 (two standard deviations below the mean). The 
procedure becomes more complicated when a portfolio of assets is considered, as the 
covariance between them needs to be calculated, but the overall principle of estimating a 
probability distribution and calculating the VaR accordingly remains intact. The main 
advantage of the variance-covariance method is its simplicity in calculating the VaR, but 
the normality assumption is one of its main drawbacks (Damodaran, 2003; Best, 2000). 
Another alternative to calculating the VaR is through the use of simulation. There 
are two main simulation techniques used to estimate the VaR: historical simulation and 
Monte Carlo Simulation. The use of historical simulation offers one of the simplest 
methods to calculate VaR by using historical data to predict future outcomes. One example 
to highlight the use of historical simulation is the calculation of oil prices. Historical data 
of oil prices across 5 years in the past is obtained and graphed. Then, a simulation of future 
values is determined, assuming these values follow the same distribution as the historical 
data. Finally, the VaR is calculated by obtaining the 95th percentile value (Best, 2000; 
Damodaran, 2003; Jorion, 2000) .  
Another simulation method of calculating the VaR is Monte Carlo Simulation. The 
Monte Carlo procedure is performed to generate different values for the risk factors that 
are under study, with the purpose of estimating the probability of occurrence of certain 
risks by running a number of simulations using random variables (Best, 2000; Damodaran, 
2003; Jorion, 2000). The use of Monte Carlo Simulation is described in a separate section 
earlier in this chapter. The use of Monte Carlo Simulation to estimate VaR is a 
recommended method mainly due to the fact that it performs a better job at estimating risks 
over a longer duration, it is not limited to the assumption of normality, and it can handle 
the volatility of historical data. However, the use of the variance-covariance method would 
suffice if the assumption of normality holds and if risk is analyzed over a short period of 
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time. Also, if sufficient historical data is available for risk that does not observe volatile 
changes, then historical simulation, which only relies on historical data and trends, can also 
be employed.  
The VaR method is also associated with some disadvantages, some of which are 
similar to that of Monte Carlo Simulation. VaR can lead to false conclusions on risk if the 
models used in the Monte Carlo Simulation are faulty. Also, VaR has mostly been used in 
the financial sector to measure short-term risks, which is applicable when analyzing 
financial or operating risks that involve day-to-day fluctuations. This could be solved 
through the use of Monte Carlo Simulation, which will improve its effectiveness in 
measuring long-term risks, but VaR will then experience the same disadvantages as those 
of Monte Carlo Simulation. In addition, VaR is used to measure the potential losses on a 
project due to a particular risk factor, without regard to the positive impacts that might be 
realized if that risk is accepted. Such impacts include obtaining higher returns due to 
accepting risks or ensuring that the project would not fail if one entity were to assume too 
much risk. For these reasons, the use of VaR can offer a quick solution to measure risks 
that might occur in the short term, and should be avoided when long term risks are to be 
considered, especially since other methods that were previously discussed offer better 
solutions. 
This chapter presented different types of risk assessment techniques, which include 
Bayesian Analysis, Decision Trees, Monte Carlo Simulation, Artificial Neural Networks, 
Method of Moments, and Value at Risk. After reviewing the advantages and limitations of 
each method, it is recommended to cater the risk assessment technique to the problem at 
hand, as there is not one methodology that is clearly superior to the rest in all facets. 
Therefore, it is necessary to identify the risks that are inherent in a project before 
proceeding with the analysis of the risks, in order to be able to select the best approach that 
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fits the types of variable risk factors, the availability of data on the risk factors, the skill set 
of the analysts, and the required accuracy.  
For assessing the risks on a PPP project, the process of quantifying such risks is a 
complicated task. The uncertainties that are embedded within each variable must be taken 
into consideration while assessing risks and quantifying them. This makes the risk 
assessment part of the risk management framework a complicated process. The methods 
presented earlier provide an overall perspective on the work that has been done in 
attempting to quantify risks, some of which have been applied in measuring infrastructure 
and PPP risks. With the knowledge of the risks that are likely to occur in a PPP project, as 
well as their measured values, the next step of the risk management process involves the 
mitigation of those risks.  
 
7.4  Risk Mitigation 
The final step of the risk management process is risk mitigation. The primary 
objective of risk mitigation is to reduce the risk of an undesirable event and to decrease the 
impacts if the event if it does occur (European Investment Bank, 2015). After identifying 
and quantifying the risks that are applicable to the project, a mitigation strategy should be 
developed in order to maintain its financial viability. The most common mitigation 
methods in PPP projects have evolved around three main strategies: retention, transfer, and 
sharing, all of which revolve around the concept of risk allocation (Jin & Zhang, 2011; 
Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 2003; Vassallo, 2006). Within each of these strategies, there are 
additional considerations that can be made; details of these considerations will be discussed 




7.4.1 RISK ALLOCATION 
 
As previously indicated, the risks in PPPs should be allocated to the party best able 
to manage them, which is the basic principle in deciding whether to retain, transfer, or share 
risks. In order to better understand this statement, Irwin, 2007 proposed three 
considerations that need to be addressed (Irwin, 2007): 
 
1. The ability of the entity to influence the specific risk 
2. The ability of the entity to influence the effect of the risk on the project value 
3. The ability of the entity to absorb the risk at the lowest cost 
 
The ability of the entity to influence the specific risk depends on the ability of that 
entity to make decisions that affect that particular risk factor. The decision taken by an 
entity should affect the outcome of the risk factor, in order for it to be able to bear that risk. 
One example is that of construction risk; the private entity can influence the schedule, cost, 
and quality by employing efficient, cost-cutting, and highly sophisticated strategies during 
the construction phase of the project. 
The ability of the entity to influence the effect of the risk on the project value relates 
to the decision-making authority of an entity in reducing the impact of risks. Some risks 
cannot be eliminated completely, such as those of natural disasters or environmental risks, 
but the government could, for example, choose the project location by taking those risks 
into consideration. As such, the risk would be allocated to the party best able to reduce the 
negative impact of such a risk occurring.  
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The ability of the entity to absorb the risk at the lowest cost should be taken into 
consideration particularly when neither partner can reduce the probability of occurrence of 
a certain risk. One example is that of market risks, in particular inflation risk. The risk 
should be allocated to the stakeholder that can best bear the risk at the lowest possible cost- 
One common procedure used for risk allocation is the utilization of a risk matrix, 
in which the identified risks are first listed and then each one of them is assigned to the 
designated party (Ng & Loosemore, 2007) according to the ability of each party to better 
handle the risk. A risk matrix is aimed at providing managers in both the public and private 
sector with a basis for identifying the risks that could occur and their allocation. The risks 
are allocated to ensure that they can be dealt with at the lowest cost and with the least 
detrimental consequences to the project’s value for money (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). 
While there is much disagreement in the literature on how each particular risk is allocated 
to one party, there is a general consensus on some of the risks.  Table 7.2, adopted from 
(Han, 2013), shows different allocations of risk according to various sources from the 
literature (Arndt, 1998; VDTF, 2001; Wang, Tiong, Ting, & Ashley, 2000; NTSA, 2004; 
Li B. , Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Lam, Wang, Lee, 
& Tsang, 2007). 
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Table 7.2 A Comparison of Risk Allocation Preferences in PPP Projects. Source (Han, 2013) 













Lam et al. 
(2007) 
Political Termination of concession by 
government 
 Public  Public  Public  
 Expropriation and 
nationalization 
 Public  Public Public Private  
 Political opposition    Public Public   
 Change in law Share Share Public Share Share Private Share 
 Unstable government     Public  Public 
 Project approval and permit Share  Private   Share Private 
 Influential economic events   Private  Private   
 Changes in industrial code of 
practices 
Share  Private Share Private   
Construction Ability to finance Private  Private  Private   
 Improper design Private Private Private Private Private Private Private 
 Insolvency of subcontractors Private Private  Private Private  Private 
 Quality risk Private Private Private Private Private Private Private 
 Site safety Private      Private 
 Availability of labor/materials  Public   Private  Private 
 Ground conditions   Private  Private Private Public 
 Site availability Share  Private  Public Private Public 
 Construction/design changes    Public  Public  Public Private 
 Labor disputes and strikes  Private Private    Private 
 Land use    Public Public Public  
 Waste of materials Private    Private Private  
 Construction cost overrun Private Private Private Private Private Private  
 Construction completion Private Private Private Private Private Private  
 Supporting utilities risk Share Share    Public  
 High financial cost Private Private   Private   
 Unproven engineering 
techniques 
Private Private Private Private Private   
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Lam et al. 
(2007) 
 Protection of geological and 
historical objects 
 Private Private     
Operation Operation cost overrun Private   Private Private Private  
 Operator default Private Private Private   Private  
 Quality of operation Private Private Private Private  Private  
 High maintenance cost Private  Private Private Private   
 Frequency of maintenance Private  Private Private Private   
 Low operating productivity  Private Private  Private Private   
 Residual assets risk Private  Public Private    
 Condition of facility  Private Private      
Legal Contractual risk Share      Public 
 Third party tort liability     Private  Private 
 Ownership assets  Share Share Private  Private  
 Insolvency of concession 
company  
 Private  Private    
Market Insufficient income Private Private   Private   
 Fluctuation of material cost 
(by government) 
 Public Public Public  Public  
 Fluctuation of material cost 
(by private sector) 
 Private Private Private  Private  
 Tariff change  Private Private Private Private Private  
 Market demand change Share Private  Share Private Private  
 Exclusivity  Share Private     
Economic Inflation risk  Share Share Share Private Share Share 
 Interest rate  Share  Private Private Share  
 Foreign currency exchange 
rate 
 Public  Private    
Others Force majeure Share  Share Share Share Share  
 Residual risk     Private Public  
 Weather Public   Public Private  Share 
 
Table 7.2 (Continued)  
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The risk matrix is constructed by consulting with experts in the public and private 
sectors, as well as project lenders. While each of the project stakeholders would prefer a 
risk allocation that would relieve them of the majority of risks on a project, an allocation 
mechanism is usually agreed among them and included in the contract.  
The allocation of risks in PPP projects is an intensive and critical procedure that is 
intended to make the most of the benefits of such a project delivery method. The ability to 
transfer risks from the public to the private entity is often met with an enthusiasm to transfer 
the majority of the risks. However, if too much risk is transferred, the government could 
risk losing potential private partners, and will also jeopardize the project’s financial 
viability if not properly allocated. Therefore, the risk allocation process requires an in depth 
analysis of the specific risk factors in the context of how to choose the partner that is most 
able to handle such risks. This process is essential to the success of a project, as the failure 
of either entity in the partnership could lead to the failure of the project as a whole. As a 
result, this thesis recommends basing the allocation decision on considering three aspects: 
1) the ability of the entity to influence the specific risk; 2) the ability of the entity to 
influence the effect of the risk on the project value; and 3) the ability of the entity to absorb 
the risk at the lowest cost. 
 
7.4.2 RISK MITIGATION TOOLS 
 
Regardless of the mitigation strategies, there exists a set of tools, mainly adopted 
from the financial sector that can be used in order to decrease specific risk factors. 
Examples of such mitigation tools are described in the following sections, including 
guarantees, letter of credit, bid bonds, performance bonds, surety bonds, insurance, risk 
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premium, and risk-adjusted discount rate. Each tool is usually used by a single stakeholder 




The provision of guarantees is made by the government to encourage private 
investment in public projects by accepting some of the project risks. In some cases, to 
protect the private entity from demand risk, the public partner may offer guarantees, such 
as a toll-road revenue guarantee.  A toll-road revenue guarantee ensures the private entity 
will receive a certain, minimum revenue amount in the event that demand falls below a 
specified level. In the specific case of toll roads, the use of shadow tolls is one way the 
government can provide a guarantee. With shadow tolls, the private partner is paid by the 
public entity depending on the number of vehicles operating on the roadway, without 
actually charging a toll to the roadway user. Another form of guarantee is referred to as 
availability payments, whereby the government will pay the private entity a fee depending 
on whether the facility is available for use, regardless of performance specifications 
(Yescombe, 2007; Akintoye & Beck, 2009).  
Additionally, the government may also be able to offer protection from global 
economic risks in the form of currency exchange rate guarantees, for example. Also, the 
private partner runs the risk of defaulting on loans, in which case the government may step 
in and accept the risk in lieu of the private partner by offering loan guarantees. By providing 
a loan guarantee, the public entity will assume the responsibility of paying the loan back 
to the lenders.  
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7.4.2.2 Interest Rate Swaps 
 
One of the major risks that face any PPP project is finance risk. Commercial banks 
are one of the major lenders to PPP projects which lend on a floating-rate basis, meaning 
that changes in interest rates could affect the SPV’s ability to service its debt. For this 
reason, hedging instruments have been established in order to mitigate, and even eliminate, 
interest-related risk. One such instrument is an interest rate swap, which allows the swap 
of a floating interest rate with a fixed interest rate, and vice versa. In addition, swaps can 
be made to shift from one floating rate to another. Its main advantage lies in the fact that it 
allows the SPV to shift the loan from a floating interest rate to a fixed one without having 
to refinance the bank loan (Finnerty, 2013; Akintoye & Beck, 2009; Fight, 2006). 
The principal amount, however, does not change; and the payments will take into 
consideration the original principal. This essentially shifts the risk of interest rate 
fluctuations onto the swap partner.  
This is best illustrated by an example. Assume that a corporation has agreed to pay 
its lenders a London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR + 1 percent) interest rate on the loan 
it receives, and enters into a swap with another entity. The swap deal states that the 
corporation has to pay the swap partner a rate of 5 percent, while receiving LIBOR. In this 
case, the corporation shifted its floating rate interest loan into a fixed rate interest loan, and 
would pay a rate of 6 percent. By doing this the corporation shifted the risk of fluctuating 
interest rates onto the swap partner. This will benefit both parties if the total amount to be 
paid by each is lower than before the swap. This is possible if the loan period for the swap 
partner ends before the LIBOR is expected to increase. In that sense, while the mentioned 
company might be paying a fixed rate that is higher than LIBOR for a certain amount of 
time during the project, that fee will become less than what will be paid if it retained the 
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floating interest rate if LIBOR increases as speculated. For example, if the mentioned 
company pays a 6% fixed rate for 20 years, and the swap partner pays 5% LIBOR for 5 
years, then both parties will realize benefits if the LIBOR increases to over 6% after the 5 




Options are instruments that represent contracts written between two parties, a 
buyer and a seller, that gives the buyer an option to buy or sell an asset, without being 
obliged to do so, at a fixed price. Buying an asset at a fixed price is referred to as a call 
option, while selling at a fixed price is referred to as a put option. The option is bought 
from an option seller who either owns or does not own the asset itself. Purchasing an option 
would shift the risk of loss on asset prices to the option seller (Finnerty, 2013; Yescombe, 
2007).  
Assume a company decides to purchase shares of another corporation but does not 
want to take the risk of fluctuating share prices. The company decides to purchase a call 
option instead, and pays an option seller a fee. For example, the company decides to buy 
call options on 30 shares, each priced at $100. It also agrees to pay the option seller $5 on 
each share, meaning that if the company does not exercise its option to buy the shares, the 
option seller would make $150. However, if the shares increase in value, and the company 
decides to buy the shares, then the option seller would lose an amount equal to the 
appreciation in asset price. As mentioned earlier, the use of options shifts the risk of loss 
in value of an asset to the option seller; however, purchasing an option is not free, the buyer 
still needs to pay the option seller a fee in order for the option seller to accept the risk. 
 85 
While the use of an option hedges the buyer against the risk of loss on asset prices, it also 
offers the buyer an opportunity for making gains. In the discussed example, if the buyer 
then decides to exercise its call option and buy the shares at $100, it could then sell those 
shares at a price higher than $100 and make profits.  
 
7.4.2.4 Forwards and Futures 
 
One main difference between a forwards contract and an options contract is that the 
former obliges the holder to buy a specified amount of an asset at a certain point in the 
future. The price at which the assets are bought in the future is referred to as the exercise 
price; and in a forwards contract, losses or gains cannot be realized unless the exercise 
price differs from the actual market price at settlement date. The loss or gain cannot be 
realized until the exercise is paid, that is, at the contract’s maturity date. In futures 
contracts; however, gains can be realized on a daily basis  (Finnerty, 2013; Yescombe, 
2007).  
One example of a forwards contract is if Company X agrees to buy 300 items 
produced by Company Y at $10 an item, say barrels of oil, after 60 days. If, after 60 days, 
the price of the item rises to $12, then Company X would have realized a gain of $2 on 
each item. It must be noted that the gain is only realized at maturity, which increases the 
risk of defaulting on the contract. There are two ways a default may occur: 1) if Company 
X fails to pay for the product, and 2) if Company Y fails to deliver it.  
Using the same example to illustrate the use of a futures contract, with the change 
in price of the oil per barrel being measured, the difference in price is settled at the end of 
every day. This reduces the risk of defaulting on the contract, since the payment period is 
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shorter than for a forwards contract. In addition, the use of futures usually involves a 
clearinghouse, which is responsible for settling the payments at the end of each day. That 
is, if Company X fails to pay Company Y at the end of each day, the clearinghouse is 
responsible for paying Company Y. 
The risk mitigation tools presented in this section are commonly used across a 
variety of projects. However, the choice of which tool to use depends on the type of risks 
that are inherent and on the effects of those risks. As a result, the risk mitigation step is 
recommended in this thesis to take place after the risk identification and risk assessment 
stages. In attempting to mitigate risks on a project, a risk allocation exercise must first be 
conducted to identify which parties are best able to handle these specific risks. Then, 
depending upon each risk factor, the choice of risk mitigation tool is made that will enable 
the decision makers to best mitigate the overall risks on a project. 
The topic of risks on projects is one that has garnered much study and attention. 
Proper risk management is one of the most critical project success factors, and as a result, 
a significant portion of this thesis is dedicated to a discussion on risk management. This 
thesis proposes a three-stage, sequential risk management strategy that involves risk 
identification, assessment, and mitigation. There is no single solution that can be employed 
when managing risks on project, as each project has its own characteristics. However, by 
following a common three-stage risk management strategy, decision-makers will have a 
better understanding of the risks that their projects are subject to, the impact of these risks, 
and how to mitigate them.  
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8. CAPITAL BUDGETING 
Capital budgeting refers to the process by which large capital projects are evaluated 
to assess whether an investment should be made or not. This is done through a careful 
analysis of the project’s cash flows and examination of financial ratios. After gathering all 
the information necessary to construct a project’s cash flows, the use of the ratios will help 
investors in making a decision on procuring the project. This section will explain the 
methods and financial ratios used to arrive at an investment decision (Boussabaine A. , 
2007). 
8.1  Net Present Value 
The cash flow of a project will include the revenues and costs that are expected 
over the lifetime of the project. During the contract’s lifetime, the value of money changes, 
and the net present value (NPV) analysis will take into account the time value of money as 
well as all the related revenues and costs. The formula used for NPV analysis is shown in 
Equation 8.1 (Ross, 1995; Yescombe, 2007). 
 









𝒕 = Time periods 
𝒓 =  Discount rate 
𝑪𝒕=  Cash flow during period 𝑡 
𝑪𝟎= Initial investment 
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The time periods depend on the contract length and on the time at which payments 
are made. The discount rate is used to measure the effect of time value of money, and 
companies typically use the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as the discount rate 
in their analysis. The WACC is, as its name suggests, a measure of a company’s cost of 
capital weighted according to the proportion of each capital component. Financial analysts 
will use the WACC to get an idea of what a satisfactory return on the funds should be for 
investors in a project. Equity and debt capital investors will require different returns on the 
funds they invest in the project, and the WACC weights the returns that each investor 
requires. The equation used to calculate the WACC is shown below to further illustrate 
how it is obtained (Lee & Lee, 2006). 
 






∗ 𝑅𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝑐) (8.2) 
 
Where: 
𝐸 = Market value of equity capital 
𝐷 =  Market value of debt capital 
𝑉𝑐=  Market value of total capital 
𝑅𝑒= Cost of equity 
𝑅𝑑  = Cost of debt 
𝑇𝑐 =  Corporate tax rate 
𝐸
𝑉𝑐
 = Equity proportion of total funds 
𝐷
𝑉𝑐




8.2  Internal Rate of Return 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is another metric used to measure the viability of 
investments. It helps decision makers decide whether to move forward with an investment, 
and helps in deciding among multiple investment options. Investors usually have a pre-
specified minimum rate of return which is usually the WACC that they would like to 
achieve from the investment; the minimum rate of return is then compared with the 
project’s IRR to make an investment decision. When comparing various potential projects, 
investors generally select the one that will achieve the highest IRR (Grayson, 2015).  
The formula used to calculate IRR is the same as that for NPV. The cash flow values 
of the investment are inserted, as would be done for an NPV calculation, but the value of 
IRR is achieved by setting NPV equal to zero and calculating 𝑟 in the NPV equation. The 
IRR is then usually compared against the WACC to decide whether an investment is 
profitable or not to the decision makers. If several projects are being evaluated at once, the 
one with the highest IRR is selected.  
 
8.3  Return on Investment and Equity 
Another metric that can be used to decide on an investment is the return on 
investment (ROI). ROI helps measure the efficiency of an investment, by calculating the 
amount of return that is made on an investment relative to the costs. The formula used to 
calculate ROI is shown as follows (Phillips & Phillips, 2010): 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐼 =  





A positive ROI is associated with profitable investments, and is compared with 
other investment options to arrive at an investment decision.  
In order to measure the effectiveness of an investment, the return on equity (ROE) 
metric is used. It also measures the profitability of an investment by calculating the profits 
generated from the equity invested in the project. The equation used to calculate ROE is 
shown in Equation 8.4: 
 





8.4  Payback Period 
Calculating the payback period is common for PPP projects. Often, investors want 
to know when they are expected to recover their investments, which would also affect their 
decision to invest. The payback period gives an estimate of the time required to get back 








The payback period only provides an estimate of the time needed to recover an 
investment, but not an accurate measure. It has two noticeable shortcomings, the first is 
that it does not give a description of profitability, since it does not measure benefits after 
the payback period. Second, it neglects the time value of money. Therefore, the payback 
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period is not a recommended metric to guide investors in making decisions (Weingartner, 
1969; Boardman, Reinhart, & Celec, 1982). 
 
8.5  Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
The debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) measures a company or project’s liabilities relative 
to its shareholders’ equity. The D/E provides a measure of how much debt is being used to 
finance a project relative to the amount of equity shareholders’ have invested. The D/E also 
reflects the leverage that a company or project has, or a measure of its financial risk, which 
means that the greater the D/E the greater financial risk the company or project will 
potentially incur. However, a high D/E also indicates that potential investors will earn 
more. This could happen if the debt amount helps the project generate more revenues than 
if no debt was used, and the earnings could be distributed among the same number of 
shareholders. It is important to note that it would only be beneficial to the shareholders if 
the earnings outweigh the cost of debt or the interest rate. The formula used to calculate 







A measure similar, but less common than D/E, is the debt ratio. It measures the 
total company or project debts relative to the assets. It also represents leverage, and thus 
the financial risk. The formula used to measure the debt ratio is shown in Equation 8.7.  
 






8.6   Cover Ratios 
In addition to assessing the financial viability of projects, investors will also 
consider their ability to service the projects debt obligations. There are several ratios that 
can be used to determine if a company will be able to service its debts. In a project finance 
scheme, the project itself will have to be able to generate sufficient funds to cover the cost 
of borrowing; therefore, using these ratios with the project’s information alone, without 
regard to the company as a whole, is done.  
One commonly used ratio is the debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR), which 
measures the ability of a project’s cash flow to service its debt. The formula used to 








Net Operating Income = Total Revenue – Operating Expenses 
Total Debt Service =  All debt obligations due in the coming year, i.e., current debt 
obligations 
 
A DSCR value greater than 1 means that the company or project has enough funds 
to service debt obligations. A DSCR of less than 1 means that there are not enough funds 
to service the debt. For example, if the DSCR was calculated to be 0.9, the company or 
project has 90 percent of the required funds to pay off the debt obligations.  
The loan life coverage ratio (LLCR) is another metric used to measure the ability 
to service debt payments. It is a simple ratio that is calculated by dividing the NPV of an 
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investment by its senior debt. The use of this measure is more common among lenders who 
wish to know if the borrower will be able to generate enough funds to pay the required debt 
obligations. 
 
8.7  Solvency Ratio 
The solvency ratio also measures a company or project’s cash flow to service its 
debt obligations. Instead of using net income; however, it incorporates depreciation to 
measure cash flow instead of net income, which provides a more accurate estimate if the 
project’s assets depreciate greatly over the project’s life-cycle. The lower the solvency 
ratio, the less likely that it would be able to fulfill its debt payments. The formula used to 









8.8  Value for Money 
The public partner in a PPP does not generally enter into an agreement to achieve 
profits. Its main purpose is achieving the best outcome with the taxpayers’ money. 
Therefore, in order to measure the viability of PPPs, the public partner conducts a value 
for money (VfM) analysis. The main purpose of the VfM analysis is to compare the total 
benefits that have been gained by procuring the project using a PPP arrangement, making 
it similar to a cost-benefit analysis. A project is assumed to achieve value for money if it 
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yields a net gain to the taxpayers’ money when compared to procuring the project through 
conventional methods, referred to as the public sector comparator (PSC). The exact 
definition of a PSC is a matter of debate, as there are different approaches to the matter. 
Quiggin, 2014, defines it as a single number which measures the cost of providing a service 
or facility under conventional methods.  Tis benchmark is then used to measure if a PPP 
achieves value for money.  Alternately, Grimsey & Lewis, 2007, define it as the entire 
process of comparing the cost of providing the service using conventional methods and 
using a PPP (Grimsey & Lewis, 2007). In some countries, conducting a PSC study is a 
legal requirement in order to proceed with a PPP project (European Investment Bank, 
2015). The comparison process should take into consideration the total life-cycle cash 
flows, which are adjusted for risk, as mentioned earlier. The principle of risk transfer is 
essential to the VfM process, since one of the main differences between a conventional 
procurement method and a PPP is how risks are shared. Figure 8.1, adopted from Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2004, gives a basic idea of the comparison made using a PSC to get an estimate 




Figure 8.1 Public Sector Comparison with PPP (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004) 
The PSC is calculated by taking into consideration the factors shown in the Figure 
8.1 The risks that are retained by the private sector are the same for both the PPP and the 
PSC alternatives, since in both cases, these risks are borne by the public partner. Base costs 
refer to the cost of procuring the service under conventional methods, and includes the 
initial investment and operations and maintenance costs. Competitive neutrality is a term 
that refers to the costs that the private sector pays, but the public sector does not have to 
pay. By calculating these costs, such as taxes, it is assumed that the public sector does not 
gain an advantage over the private sector by not paying these costs. The risk to be 
transferred to the private sector are also calculated as part of the PSC, since they will be 
borne by the public sector if the project is procured by conventional methods, but they are 
not calculated as part of the PPPs total costs (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). 
The PSC is estimated by assuming a procurement method that will be funded 
entirely by the government, but will bear the least cost to the government, which could be 
a design-bid-build or a design-build, for example, whichever has a lower cost. The 
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calculation of the PSC should also incorporate any efficiencies that the public sector may 
contribute to, such as tax cuts. For this reason, different scenarios of the PSC are modeled 
in order to make sure the PPP achieves a value for money. Moreover, the net present value 
(NPV) of the costs is calculated in order to compare with the PPP alternative. Therefore, 
the PPP is considered to achieve VfM if the NPV of its costs are lower than those of the 
PSC (Yescombe, 2007; European Investment Bank, 2015; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004) . 
In calculating the life-cycle costs of a project under both the PPP and the 
conventional procurement scenarios, a discount rate must be selected. The discount rate 
varies depending on the requirements of each country in which the project is being 
procured. For example, in Australia, the capital asset pricing method is used to come up 
with the discount rate, while in Canada the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 
used. The United Kingdom uses a fixed rate, and in the United States, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) issue an annual rate for use in the PSC analysis. 
There are several limitations to the use of the PSC as a measurement of value for 
money of PPP projects. One such limitation is that the decision is often narrowed down to 
a single number that involves forecasting and uncertainty. This simple comparison between 
two numbers makes the decision rather simplistic, and is one of the negatives of using the 
PSC.  Also, Heald (2003) claims that the PSC lacks robustness, because it narrows the 
decision down to a single value. Bain (2010) also claims that a PSC is often a tool that 
lacks transparency, and as such, it raises suspicion concerning its suitability to provide a 
decision on large, capital intensive projects.  
The capital budgeting metrics presented in this chapter provide a complete 
overview of metrics that investors and decision-makers use when making an investment 
decision. Not all of the presented metrics can provide definitive values that will lead the 
decision-makers to invest in a project, but they can be used as a preliminary evaluation. 
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One example is the payback period, which neglects the time value of money, making it 
only viable as a preliminary indication of when the investor could expect to have a return 
on investment. However, it should not be used as the only metric that would guide an 
investment decision. It is recommended that investors and decision-makers should conduct 
a thorough capital budgeting exercise, and examine all the ratios presented in this chapter 
before making an investment decision. The analysis should be led by the NPV and IRR 
analyses, and followed by computing return on investment and equity, cover ratios, and 
solvency ratio. In addition, a value for money analysis using a public sector comparator 
can be used to give preliminary guidance on the expected benefits of a PPP investment; 







The use of PPPs in urban projects has proliferated in the past few years. This is due, 
mainly, to the financial investment that private investors can provide for large-scale urban 
public projects. Also, the private sector has realized the opportunity for profits from 
investing in such projects. The results of PPP ventures have varied from one project to 
another, but they have generally been viewed as an overall success. The main reasons that 
have been attributed to the failures of certain PPP projects have been the inability of the 
private partner to repay its debts, resulting in bankruptcy filings. This is a result of less than 
expected revenues being gained, in which several factors can be attributed to this; these 
factors are mainly related to uncertainties involved with a PPP project and inaccuracies in 
forecasting key parameters such revenue streams, as well as inadequacy in assessing the 
effects of risk on the financial viability of the project. 
This thesis proposes a framework for assessing an urban public-private partnership 
project’s financial viability, which would provide investors and public officials alike with 
an overview of the complexities involved in assessing a project’s financial viability. The 
proposed framework takes into consideration the effects of several factors on the decision, 
such as the project’s length, the type of PPP arrangement, the financial structure, the 
project’s cash flow, and the effects of risk. These factors, when combined, have a 
significant impact on the profitability of a project. This thesis provides an overview of each 
component and shows how they all interact with each other in terms of making a financial 
viability decision. 
First, before entering into a PPP arrangement, its use should be justified.  
Experience has shown that a PPP can offer great benefits to governments that face 
budgetary limits. Despite the complex nature involved in setting up a PPP contract, from 
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deciding on the financing aspect, to the revenue structure, and to the risk allocation, a PPP 
can be a successful alternative to traditional procurement. This is particularly highlighted 
in situations when an urban project needs to be procured and the government does not have 
the resources, whether financial or technical, to do it alone. While the need for the project 
governs the public entity’s decision in developing countries, this decision is based on a 
Value for Money (VfM) analysis in developed countries.  
After agreeing on a PPP approach to project delivery, an in-depth financial viability 
study must be made in order to decide on whether to move forward with the investment. 
The framework proposed in this thesis suggests starting with listing out the main inputs to 
the financial viability study, which include the type of PPP arrangement, the contract 
duration, and the financial structure. The PPP arrangements that are presented vary 
significantly from one another, they range from only offering services to designing, 
building, financing, operating, and maintaining an entire project.  It has been found that 
there is not one contract arrangement that suits all PPP projects, but the capabilities of each 
party, along with their intended goals for the project, need to be considered before making 
a decision which PPP arrangements to select It was also found that the choice of contract 
duration should be made to ensure that each party achieves their expected goals from the 
project. Moreover, the choice of financial structure was found to vary depending on the 
project participants and on their expected goals.   
The financing of the PPP agreement is one of the most important factors that could 
determine the success or failure of a project. PPP projects are associated with large capital 
investments and long contract durations, meaning that, in most cases, a mixture of both 
debt and equity is needed to be able to finance a project. One of the first decisions that the 
private entity should make is whether to create a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to procure 
the project, and finance it based on project financing. The use of project finance is 
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recommended when the project is able to independently generate the necessary cash flows 
to fund the project over its life cycle. Then, a decision should be made regarding  the 
amount of funding that need to be raised, and specifically what mixture of debt and equity 
should  be used, taking into consideration the risks associated with each. It is found that 
there is no single mixture of debt and equity that should be employed for every project; 
rather the mixture varies across projects. However, it is generally common for debt to make 
up the majority of the funding.  
After establishing the type of PPP arrangement, the contract duration, and the 
financing structure of the project, its cash flows must be studied to address whether the 
project should be procured. Costs and revenues for PPP projects vary mainly depending on 
the type of PPP arrangement and the financial structure. Each project has its own costs and 
revenues; however, there are common cost and revenue categories that exist across 
projects. Costs are generally studied based on which stage of the life cycle they occur in, 
while revenues are classified as either user-based or government-based. The process of 
detailing the costs and benefits of a project requires careful analysis and continuous follow-
up throughout the project’s life cycle.  
After describing the costs and benefits that are associated with a project, it was 
found that an essential step in the financial viability study must then be followed, which is 
risk management. This thesis recommends a three-stage sequential process for risk 
management, which includes risk identification, assessment, and mitigation. The risk 
identification stage involves an in-depth study of all the risks that could affect the project, 
which is essential in order to be able to analyze the possible impacts of the risk on the 
project. It is recommended to follow a risk checklist when identifying the risks, in which 
the different risk factors are grouped into one of the many possible categories. Risk 
identification is a process that should take place at the very early stages of the project, and 
 101 
will continue throughout the project’s life cycle. Afterwards, the risk assessment stage must 
be completed in order to be able to identify the potential impacts of risks on a project. It 
was found that the risk assessment should start with a sensitivity analysis of the risk 
variables identified earlier. Afterwards, risk assessment methods should be used to study 
the impact of these sensitive risks. Several methods are presented in this thesis that can be 
used to assess risk. Each method has its own benefits and limitations, and each should be 
carefully studied in order to decide on which to use. In cases in which there is an established 
and known sequence of risks and decisions, which yield outcomes that can be discretized, 
it was found that decision trees based on Bayesian Analysis is recommended. However, if 
there is no established sequence, and the risk outcomes cannot be discretized, then it was 
found that Monte Carlo Simulation, the Method of Moments, and Artificial Neural 
Networks were able to provide an accurate assessment of the risk variables. It was found 
that whenever the distribution of possible values that risk variables might take is known, 
and the correlation among the variables is identified, Monte Carlo Simulation can be 
employed. Otherwise, it was found that the use of the Method of Moments or Artificial 
Neural Networks is preferred. As a result, a mixture of more than one risk method among 
Monte Carlo Simulation, Method of Moments and Artificial Neural Networks is 
recommended; since they can combine to assess the various types of risk variables that 
were identified. Finally, the risk mitigation step takes place, which is aimed at reducing the 
impact of risk on the project. Risk mitigation was found to involve risk allocation and the 
use of risk mitigation tools. In allocating risks to either the public or the private entity, a 
three-step analysis of the entities must be considered, and it includes: the ability of the 
entity to influence the specific risk, the ability of the entity to influence the effect of the 
risk on the project value, and the ability of the entity to absorb the risk at the lowest cost. 
This will ensure that risk is allocated to the party best able to handle it. 
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Afterwards, a risk-adjusted cash flow is constructed, which contains the range of 
revenue and cost variables identified from the risk management stage, along with their 
probabilities and expected values. Then, the thesis moves to describe the different capital 
budgeting equations and ratios that are used to provide the decision maker with an estimate 
of the projects financial viability. Several tools were presented for capital budgeting, but it 
was found that the NPV is the most commonly used method; and it is the one that should 
guide the decision. However, the decision maker should also study the cover ratios, 
solvency ratio, internal rate of return, and conduct a value for money analysis to obtain a 
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